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Abstract 
 
We document that labor productivity of the globally most productive firms – the “frontier” – has 
diverged from all other firms – the “rest” – throughout the 2000s. This divergence remains after 
controlling for capital intensity and markups, and is strongest in ICT services, indicative of “winner-
takes-all” dynamics. We also find weakening catch-up and market selection below the frontier, which 
can explain why this divergence at the firm level is linked to weaker aggregate productivity. The 
divergence is found to be stronger in industries where product market regulations are less competition 
friendly, highlighting the need for regulatory policy to improve the contestability of markets. 
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1 
Introduction 
Aggregate productivity growth slowed in many OECD countries, even before the financial crisis, 
igniting a spirited debate on the future of productivity (e.g. Brynjolfsson and McAfee, 2011 vs 
Gordon, 2016).2 This debate has been conducted, by and large, from a macroeconomic perspective, 
and implicitly concerns the prospects for innovation at the global productivity frontier. However, 
little is actually known about the productivity performance of this global frontier over time.3 This 
is surprising since aggregate productivity and differences thereof across countries are increasingly 
being linked to the widespread heterogeneity in firm performance within countries and sectors 
(Syverson, 2011; Garicano, Lelarge, Van Reenen, 2016; Bartelsman, Haltiwanger and Scarpetta, 
2013; Hsieh and Klenow, 2009).4  
To better understand these phenomena, this paper utilizes cross-country longitudinal firm 
level data to shed new light on the evolution of this heterogeneity during the period of the 
slowdown. We focus on the global productivity frontier (the “best”) – defined as the top 5% of 
firms in terms of labor or multi-factor productivity (MFP) levels within two-digit industries – and 
compare it with all other firms below the frontier (the “rest”).  Our key finding is a rising 
productivity gap between the frontier – which shows robust growth – and all other firms below – 
which grow at a sluggish rate – during the 2000s. Put differently, we uncover that an important 
and so far overlooked feature of slow aggregate productivity growth in recent years is a rising 
divergence between the “best” and the “rest” in terms of firm-level productivity.5  
We show that this rising labor productivity gap between global frontier and laggard firms 
largely reflects divergence in revenue based MFP (MFPR). We then explore the role of market 
2
 For further evidence on the nature and causes of the productivity slowdown, see, among others Fernald (2014), 
Cette, Fernald and Mojon (2016) and Syverson (2017). 
3
 Throughout the paper we use the term “laggard” and “non-frontier” interchangeably – they refer to the group of firms 
that are not at the frontier. 
4
 Recent theoretical work also established a link between macroeconomic productivity performance and the distance 
between leaders and laggards (Akcigit and Ates, 2019a, 2019b; Brynjolfsson, Rock and Syverson, 2018). 
5
 In fact, we show in Section 3 that the two trends are systematically related: those industries that experience a large 
global divergence are also those where global productivity growth was weaker. 
2 
power and conclude that the divergence in MFPR is not primarily due to an increasing ability of 
frontier firms to charge higher markups. While we find evidence that market power of frontier 
firms has increased among services sectors, this amounts to less than one-third of the total 
divergence in MFPR. This leads us to the conclusion that the rising MFPR gap between global 
frontier and laggard firms is to a large extent a divergence in productivity or technology, broadly 
defined.6  
In addition to documenting this divergence at the global level, a key contribution of the 
paper is shedding light on the potential drivers of this trend from three different angles. First, we 
investigate the presence of winner-takes-all dynamics (Brynjolfsson and McAfee, 2011), then we 
test whether there is evidence for a slower catch-up of productivity to the frontier. Finally, we 
highlight several aspects of declining business dynamism more generally. 
In particular, we find three distinct patterns that are supportive of the winner-takes-all 
hypothesis. First, there is an increase in the market share by the frontier, which is more pronounced 
in ICT services – a sector that is generally characterized by very low marginal costs. Second, 
divergence in MFP itself is stronger within ICT services – in particular within data services. Third, 
within the global frontier, the productivity of the “most elite” segment of firms (captured by the 
top 2%) has risen relative to that of other segments of the frontier already high up in the 
productivity distribution (top 5% or top 10%). This pattern again is strongest in ICT and data 
services, where the gap between the top and the rest of the distribution has increased very strongly 
(up to 0.6-0.9 log-points) compared to other services (by 0.3 log-points). 
Next we test whether the rate of productivity catch-up has declined, which would be 
indicative of weaker knowledge diffusion from the frontier to laggard firms. We estimate the rate 
of convergence to the global productivity frontier for sub-periods of our sample and find a marked 
decline over time. Consistent with this, we also find that persistence at the frontier has increased. 
These patterns suggest a more difficult entry to the top segment of the distribution and a slowdown 
in the catch-up of firms below the frontier.7  
6
 Such broader definition encompasses not only technological innovation but also the capacity of tacitly combining 
various intangibles – computerized information, innovative property and economic competencies (Corrado, Hulten 
and Sichel, 2009) as well as management (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007) – in business processes. 
7
 See complementary and supporting evidence in Bahar (2018) who documents that the strength of convergence is 
weaker close to the top of the distribution. These findings about weaker convergence exclude explanations for the 
3 
The third aspect among the potential drivers of the diverging trend is business dynamism. 
We document a slowdown in the growth enhancing nature of market selection, captured by two 
key patterns. First, we find a decline in the share of young firms coupled with a higher productivity 
threshold for entrants. In parallel, we also document a higher survival probability of firms with 
persistently weak profitability which would typically exit in a competitive market.  
We then also test the aggregate implications of this divergence. A rising productivity gap 
in itself can be related to either faster or slower aggregate productivity growth, depending on the 
relative strength of the contribution of the fast growing frontier or the sluggish performance of all 
other firms below. To establish that the rising productivity gap is indeed a key feature of the 
productivity slowdown throughout the 2000s, we test the relationship between industry aggregate 
productivity growth and the degree of firm-level divergence between the best and the rest. We find 
negative and statistically significant relationships across several alternative productivity and 
frontier measures, indicating that the two phenomena are linked.  
Finally, we investigate the role of the regulatory environment in driving the increasing 
productivity gap between the frontier and lagging firms. Declining business dynamism suggests 
that the stagnation in the productivity growth of laggard firms may be connected to rising barriers 
to entry and a decline in the contestability of markets (Furman and Orszag, 2016). Regulations that 
are not reformed to adjust to structural changes could lead to weakening competition among firms 
and could thus lower their incentives to adopt the latest technologies and business practices. In line 
with this hypothesis, we show – using a difference- in-difference estimation with instrumental 
variables – that MFP divergence is more pronounced in sectors where pro-competitive product 
market reforms or deregulation were least extensive.  
Our paper builds on previously established facts about the large and persistent 
heterogeneities that are present across firms in terms of productivity levels, even in narrowly 
defined sectors (Bartelsman and Doms, 2001; Syverson, 2004 and 2011). It also links to several 
strands of a more recent literature that document structural changes in the economy. Many of them 
developed since our research on the global frontier started,8 but they typically focus on the US or 
divergence based on a large or rising variance of firm-level productivity growth – if anything, they are consistent 
with more persistence. 
8
 See Andrews, Criscuolo and Gal (2015). 
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selected European countries individually. In particular, several studies have shown an increasing 
dispersion in firm-level outcomes that are closely related to productivity, such as firm size (see the 
work on “Superstar firms” and rising concentration by Autor et al, 2017a, 2017b; Covarrubias, 
Gutiérrez and Philippon, 2019), wages (Song et al, 2018), profits and financial returns (Furman 
and Orszag, 2016) and markups (De Loecker, Eeckhout and Unger, 2018; Calligaris, Criscuolo 
and Marcolin, 2018).9 Many of these papers find a link between these structural changes and 
increasing digitalization and globalization, which could induce a change in the production 
technology with “winner-takes-all” features or an increased role for intangible capital in 
production (Crouzet and Eberly, 2018). Our findings also relate to the literature on the rising 
misallocation across firms (Gopinath et al, 2017) and how changes in dispersion across firms are 
related to aggregate productivity developments (Foster et al, 2018).  
The divergence of productivity across firms is also consistent with recent evidence on how 
technologies spread across countries and firms. Adoption lags for new technologies across 
countries are falling, but in parallel, penetration rates within countries are lower than before 
(Comin and Mestieri, 2018). Put differently, new technologies developed at the global frontier are 
spreading more and more rapidly across countries but their diffusion to all firms within any 
economy is slowing, with many available technologies remaining unexploited by a non-trivial 
share of firms. This is consistent with the evidence of Autor et al (2017b) who show that slower 
citation speeds are associated with stronger concentration in sectors. 
Indeed many recent theoretical explanations for the rise in the heterogeneity of firm-level 
performance include a slowdown or a delay in the diffusion of recent general purpose technologies 
(Akcigit and Ates, 2019a, 2019b; Brynjolfsson, Rock and Syverson, 2018; Benhabib, Perla and 
Tonetti, 2017).10 Other theories link it to very low interest rates, which can lead to stronger 
incentives for industry leaders to invest and preserve their strategic advantage than lagging firms 
– if the gap between the two is sufficiently large (Liu, Mian and Sufi, 2019). Yet another theory
9
 A series of papers have also documented an increase in productivity dispersion within individual countries: for the 
US, see Decker et al (2016), Bahar (2018), Bessen (2017), and Brown, Dinlersoz and Earle (2016); for the UK, see 
Faggio, Salvanes and Van Reenen (2010); for France, see Cette, Corde and Lecat (2018); and for several individual 
OECD countries, see Berlingieri, Blanchenay and Criscuolo (2017). 
10
 For an earlier literature on the diffusion of technologies across firms, see Jovanovic and MacDonald (1994). For 
the role of imitation by the least productive firms in their productivity catch-up, see Perla and Tonetti (2014). 
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focusing on productivity divergence in the post-crisis period, points to cyclicality in technology 
adoption efforts by firms as a potential driver (Anzoategui et al, forthcoming).  
The next section discusses the firm level data and productivity measurement issues, before 
identifying and describing the characteristics of firms at the global productivity frontier. Section 2 
presents new evidence on labor productivity divergence between global frontier and laggard firms, 
while also explores the robustness to this result to controlling for capital deepening and markups. 
Section 3 explores potential structural drivers such as winner-takes-all dynamics and slowing 
convergence, highlighting the aggregate implications. Section 4 establishes a significant impact of 
product market regulation on the size of the MFP gap. The final section concludes. 
1. Data and Measurement
This paper relies on a longitudinal cross-country firm-level database (Orbis) using harmonized 
company accounts and covering 24 OECD countries11 over the period 1997 to 2014 for the non-
farm, non-financial business sector.12 These data are sourced from annual balance sheet and 
income statements, collected by Bureau van Dijk (BVD) – an electronic publishing firm – using a 
variety of underlying sources ranging from credit rating agencies (Cerved in Italy) to national 
banks (National Bank of Belgium for Belgium) as well as financial information providers 
(Thomson Reuters for the US).13 
11
 These countries are all from the OECD: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Latvia, Luxembourg, Netherlands, , Poland, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Slovenia and the United States. The country coverage is somewhat smaller in the policy 
analysis. The Orbis database tends to have a better coverage for European countries, while the US segment is basically 
the listed companies (Gal, 2013; Kalemli-Ozcan, Karabarbounis and Villegas-Sanchez, 2015; Bureau van Dijk, 2016). 
This means that the global frontier firms are likely to be captured, even though coverage for European ones are more 
complete. To mitigate any concerns arising from the coverage of laggard firms, the regressions throughout the paper 
include a rich set of fixed effects, which control for country- and year specific differences. 
12
 This means retaining industries with 2 digit codes from 5 to 82, excluding 64-66 (financial services) in the European 
classification system NACE Rev 2, which is equivalent to the international classification system ISIC Rev. 4 at the 
two-digit level. In most of our discussion below we focus on two sector-groups: manufacturing (spanning 2-digit 
sectors 10 to 33) and business services, or services in short form (sectors 45 to 82, excluding financial services). 
13
 See the full list of information providers to Bureau van Dijk regarding financial information for the set of countries 
retained in the analysis in Appendix F. 
6 
Orbis is typically recognized as the largest available cross-country company-level database 
for economic and financial research and it (or its European segment Amadeus) serves as the 
standard source for cross-country firm level studies (Gopinath et al, 2017). However, since the 
information is primarily collected for use in the private sector typically with the aim of financial 
benchmarking, a number of steps need to be undertaken before the data can be used for economic 
analysis. The steps we apply closely follow suggestions by Kalemli-Ozcan et al (2015) and 
previous OECD experience (Gal, 2013; Ribeiro, Menghinello and de Backer, 2010).14 Three broad 
steps are: i) ensuring comparability of monetary variables across countries and over time (industry-
level PPP conversion and deflation); ii) deriving new variables that will be used in the analysis 
(capital stock, productivity); and iii) keeping company accounts with valid and relevant 
information for our present purposes (filtering or cleaning). Orbis is a subsample of the universe 
of companies for most countries, retaining the larger and hence likely more productive firms. To 
mitigate problems arising from this – particularly the under-representation of small firms – we 
restrict our sample to firms with more than 20 employees on average over their observed lifespan. 
For more details, see Appendix F. 
1.1 Productivity measurement 
As a starting point, we focus on labor productivity, which is calculated by dividing real value 
added (using country specific two-digit industry deflators, combined with 2005 industry-level 
USD PPPs) by the number of employees. Labor productivity – besides its simplicity – also has the 
advantage that it retains the largest set of observations, as it does not require the availability of 
measures for fixed assets or intermediate inputs (proxied by materials 𝑚𝑡) potentially used for 
deriving multi-factor productivity (MFP). 
Our baseline MFP is derived from a value added based production function estimation 
using the widely used Wooldridge (2009) control function based methodology, with the number 
of employees and real capital stock as inputs and materials as the proxy variable. More specifically, 
14
 We are grateful for Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan and Sevcan Yesiltas for helpful discussions about their experience and 
suggestions with the Orbis database. 
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we assume a value added based Cobb-Douglas production function and estimate regressions of the 
following form (equation (1)), separately for each two-digit industry j:  
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝐾𝑗𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝐿𝑗𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝜈𝑐𝑗 + 𝜂𝑡𝑗 + 𝜀it,  for all industries j=1,…J (1) 
where 𝑦it denotes log of real value added, 𝑘it denotes the log of real capital stock, and 𝑙it the log 
of the number of employees. 𝜈𝑐𝑗  and 𝜂𝑡𝑗  are country and year fixed effects, respectively (allowed to
vary for each 2-digit industry), and 𝜀it is the error term. In order to mitigate the limitations from 
not observing firm-level prices, we also correct our revenue based MFP measure (MFPR) by firm- 
and time-varying markups applying the markup estimation methodology of De Loecker and 
Warzynski (2012) and defining markup corrected MFPR as the difference between MFPR and 
markups (both measured in logs; see details in Appendix F.) 
1.2 Measuring the productivity frontier 
In keeping with the existing literature (e.g. Bartelsman, Haskel and Martin, 2008), we define the 
global productivity frontier in a very clean and transparent manner: it is the top 5% of firms in 
terms of (log) productivity levels, within each detailed industry and year.15 Using an MFPR-based 
productivity frontier definition, for example, results in a global frontier size of about 80 companies 
for the typical industry (more specifically, the median is 83 for “manufacturing of basic metals”). 
For the sectors populated with a large number of businesses, the frontier represents about 400-500 
companies (e.g. in retail or wholesale trade or construction). 
Importantly, and in line with the existing literature, the set of frontier firms is allowed to 
change over time. This choice is necessary to ensure that when assessing the evolution of the global 
frontier, we account for turbulence or churning at the top: some firms can become highly 
15
 As the coverage of firms may change over time, we keep the frontier number fixed over time in our baseline 
definition. Specifically, we use the top 5% of the median number of firms (across years), separately by each two-digit 
industry. This still allows for inherent differences in the size of industries in terms of the number of firms. As Figure 
A5 in Appendix A shows, the choice among alternatives (fixed absolute number or a different threshold, at 10%) does 
not affect the main finding of a growing productivity gap between the frontier and the rest. The diverging pattern is 
also robust to using a time-varying 5% for defining the number of frontier firms, see Andrews, Criscuolo and Gal 
(2015), Figure A1 and regression results in this paper (Table A1, Panel A, in Appendix A). 
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productive and enter the frontier, while other, previously productive businesses can lose their edge 
and fall below the frontier. This is symmetric to the treatment of the group of firms below the 
frontier, whose composition is also allowed to change through entry and exit. As will be discussed 
in Section 3, there is indeed substantial churning at the frontier, mostly concentrated amongst the 
top quintile of the productivity distribution. But our finding of productivity divergence is robust to 
using moving average firm-level productivity, which is a more persistent measure of firm 
performance (Appendix A). 
1.3 Characteristics of firms at the frontier 
Table 1 reports the cross-sectional differences in the average characteristics for firms at the global 
frontier relative to other firms in 2013, along a number of dimensions. Panel A reports these 
differences based on a labor productivity measure while Panel B does likewise using MFP. A 
number of key findings emerge. 
First, firms at the global productivity frontier are on average 3 to 4 times more productive 
than non-frontier firms.16 At first glance, these differences appear large but are to be expected 
given the already widespread heterogeneity in firm productivity that is typically observed within 
narrowly defined sectors within single countries (Syverson, 2004).17,18 Second, on average, global 
frontier firms have larger sales and are more capital intensive, and more so for labor productivity. 
In manufacturing, firms at the frontier in terms of MFP (both MFPR and its markup corrected 
16
 Note that productivity is measured in logs, so the difference in Panel A for manufacturing firms between frontier 
and laggard firms of 1.3 translates into a ratio of exp1.3=3.6 times more productive frontier than laggards firms. 
17
 For example, within 4 digit manufacturing industries in the United States, Syverson (2004) finds a 2-to-1 ratio in 
value added per worker between the 75th- and 25th-percentile plants in an industry’s productivity distribution. 
Including more of the tails of the distribution amplifies the dispersion, with the average 90–10 and 95–5 percentile 
labor productivity ratios within industries in excess of 4-to-1 and 7-to-1, respectively. Note also the most studies focus 
on productivity dispersion in a single country, while our analysis pools together different countries, potentially further 
widening the productivity distribution. 
18
 A large literature motivates how such large differences in productivity can be sustained in equilibrium, despite 
market selection and the reallocation of resources being an equalizing force over the longer run. Supply-side 
explanations have typically emphasized factors related to technology shocks, management skill, R&D, or investment 
patterns (Bartelsman and Doms, 2000). The demand side also appear relevant, given evidence that imperfect product 
substitutability – due to geographical segmentation (i.e. transport costs), product differentiation (i.e. consumer 
preferences, branding/advertising) and intangible factors (customer-producer relationships) – can prevent industry 
customers from easily shifting purchases between industry producers (Syverson, 2004).  
9 
variant) have significantly higher employment than laggards, in line with existing evidence that 
productivity is positively correlated with size (Berlingieri, Calligaris and Criscuolo, 2018). 
However, frontier firms do not employ a significantly larger number of employees in services for 
any of the productivity measures analyzed, in line with recent evidence that gathers several 
country-level firm-level datasets (Berlingieri, Criscuolo and Calligaris, 2018). Third, global 
frontier firms pay also higher wages. Finally, they are also more likely to belong to a multinational 
group/conglomerate and patent more intensively than other firms.19,20
2. Productivity Divergence between the Frontier and the Rest
This section documents the evolution of productivity for the frontier and non-frontier firms, 
revealing a robust and ubiquitous divergence between the two groups. Figure 1 describes the 
evolution of labor productivity for firms at the global productivity frontier and for all other firms 
below the frontier. It shows how the unweighted average of log labor productivity across firms in 
these two groupings evolved over time, with the initial year – 2001 – indexed to 0 and separately 
for two broad sectors: manufacturing and non-financial market services (or services, in short 
form).21 
Between 2001 and 2013, firms at the global frontier have become relatively more 
productive, with their labor productivity increasing at an average annual rate of 2.8 log points in 
the manufacturing sector, compared with productivity gains of just 0.6 log points per annum for 
laggards. This divergence is even more pronounced in the services sector, with labor productivity 
19
 This is based on analysis for 2005 using a different vintage of the Orbis firm-level database used in our previous 
work (Andrews, Criscuolo and Gal, 2015). 
20
 Numerous well-known multinational companies are part of the frontier, such as Google, Apple, Amazon or 
Microsoft among ICT services, Samsung, Nokia, Siemens among electronics manufacturing as well as BMW, Ford 
and Volkswagen within car manufacturing. 
21
 Our aim with the graphical representation is merely to show the evolution of frontier productivity compared to other 
firms in a way that captures the average tendencies across all economic activities or technologies. When weighting by 
the number of firms, employees or value added across industries, the qualitative picture of divergence remains. Note 
also that we restrict the time horizon of the figures between 2001 and 2013 because the years before the 2000s and the 
latest year (2014) are less well covered in Orbis. In regressions where we can control for a rich set of fixed effects 
capturing potential changes in coverage, we can utilize a longer span of data (1997-2014). 
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at the frontier growing, on average, by 3.6 log points, compared to an average of just 0.4 log points 
for the group of laggards. The divergence is statistically significant and significantly stronger 
among services, as the next section will document. 
Since gains in labor productivity can be achieved through either higher capital intensity or 
multi-factor productivity (MFP), Figure 1 panel B plots the evolution of these two components for 
global frontier and non-frontier firms. The global frontier in now redefined in terms of the top 5% 
of firms in MFPR levels within each two digit industry and year, thus abstracting away from 
productivity trends driven by changes in capital intensity.22 Divergence between the top and the 
rest of the distribution is still present, to a similar degree as with labor productivity. Since our 
capital measure is based on balance sheet information, it incorporates both tangible and intangible 
assets, although only a limited set of the latter, such as software, data and R&D (Bureau van Dijk, 
2016). It misses some other elements such as the value of patents, brand-building, worker training 
and the development of organizational practices (Corrado, Hulten and Sichel, 2009). To the extent 
that the most productive businesses implement more and more of these type of investments, and 
at a faster pace than other firms, this may contribute to a widening gap in our measured MFP.23 
Accordingly, our interpretation on the likely drivers of MFP divergence takes into account that 
measured MFP reflects these and other factors beyond narrowly defined technology or technical 
efficiency – such as management practices or tacit knowledge, more generally (e.g. Syverson, 
2011). 
Given that our measure of multifactor productivity (MFPR) is based on information on 
revenues and that firm-level prices are not available, its divergence might also reflect the 
increasing market power of the frontier. This in turn would require a shift of our focus toward 
profitability as opposed to productivity (including technical efficiency and business practices). 
Accordingly, we attempt to assess the contribution of markup behavior to MFPR divergence, using 
22
 Using labor productivity to define the frontier group of the top 5%, the divergence of MFPR is very similar (Figure 
A2 in Appendix A). The diverging MFPR patterns are robust to using alternative definitions of MFPR, based on a 
constant returns to scale elasiticity for labor (based on industry aggregate labor shares) and capital (Solow residual) 
or the Wooldridge (2009) gross-output based production function estimation approach (Figure A7 in Appendix A) 
and to using materials (a proxy for intermediate inputs) as the fully flexible input in De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) 
markup correction methodology for a subset of 18 countries for which data are available (Figure A6 in Appendix A). 
23
 As a flipside to this issue, our value added measure subtracts spending on these intangibles as costs. As discussed 
in Corrado, Hulten and Sichel (2009), overall, the underestimation of capital and value added tends to lead to an 
upward bias on MFP. 
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the methodology outlined in Appendix F. Once we correct MFPR for markups and redefine the 
frontier using such corrected MFPR, the diverging pattern and its magnitude remains similar to 
the one with MFPR (Figure 1, Panel C).24  
Given potential concerns of coverage variations in Orbis, Figure A1 in Appendix A also 
reports figures for the industry aggregates sourced from the OECD National Accounts. Comparing 
the frontier with industry aggregates tends to understate the true gap between frontier and laggard 
firms as frontier firms will also inflate industry level productivity, particularly when their weight 
is large and/or growing. This is because the evolution of industry aggregate productivity over time 
reflects not only within-firm productivity developments but also changes in allocative efficiency.25 
Reassuringly, industry level trends look very much in line with the picture obtained with 
information from Orbis, with the aggregate lines falling between the frontier and the laggard group, 
tracing more closely the variation observed for laggards.  
As illustrated in Appendix A, the divergence is also robust to: i) using revenue-based 
(instead of value added based) labor productivity (Figure A4), ii) defining the global frontier in 
terms of the top 100 firms or the top 10% of firms instead of the top 5% (Figure A4); iii) taking 
median labor productivity in the frontier and non-frontier firms groupings as opposed to average 
productivity; iv) excluding from the sample firms that are part of a group (i.e. subsidiaries), either 
domestic or multinational, where profit-shifting activity may be relevant (Figure A6); v) using 
labor costs as labor inputs hence controlling, at least partly, for changes in skills and hours worked 
to the extent that they are reflected in wages (Figure A7, Panel C); vi) defining the frontier based 
on the average of productivity levels across three consecutive years instead of based on single 
years (Table A1); vii) and using more narrowly-defined industries (i.e. 3 and 4-digit industry 
classifications instead of two-digit ones) to better ensure that the firms compared against each 
24
 Using a frontier definition based on non-corrected MFPR shows that (Figure A3 in Appendix  A) rising markups 
for frontier firms plays only a moderate role and only for services: it captures roughly 1/3rd of the total divergence in 
the pre-crisis period – but this divergence in markup behavior is mostly unwound in the post-crisis period. 
25
 Further, the aggregate labor productivity measures from the industry data also reflect developments among the 
smallest companies (below 20 employees) as well as the self-employed. As such, it is not strictly comparable with the 
frontier and non-frontier firms but still provides a benchmark against which the patterns obtained using the Orbis 
sample can be compared. 
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other are competing in the same market and producing similar products (Figure A9-Figure 
A11).26,27
3. Potential Drivers and Aggregate Implications
The evidence presented so far suggests that the MFP gap between the global frontier and other 
firms has risen significantly over time and that this pattern has emerged even before the crisis. We 
provide additional evidence that suggests that the top of the distribution, the frontier, may be 
affected by winner-takes-all dynamics. At the same time, stalling diffusion of knowledge and best 
practices, coupled with diminished market dynamism could inhibit productivity in the distribution 
of firms below the frontier. In practice, it is difficult to distinguish the exact relative importance 
and the causal nature of these factors. The findings presented below suggest that a combination of 
them is likely to be at play. This is further corroborated by simple numerical simulations in 
Appendix B, which illustrate that the strength of the catch-up process has to weaken over time, 
market selection has to be relatively weak and likely worsening so as to produce a diverging pattern 
between the frontier away and all other firms. 
3.1. “Winner-takes-all” dynamics likely to boost the frontier 
The productivity divergence patterns unveiled so far may partly reflect the increasing potential for 
digital technologies to unleash winner-takes-all dynamics (Brynjolfsson and McAfee, 2011). Our 
findings below support the existence of such tendencies. First, divergence in MFPR is 
26
 In some instances, however, this leads to a non-trivial reduction in the number of firms within each sector – raising 
difficulties for production function estimation and increasing the prevalence of idiosyncratic and noisy patterns. This 
leads us to conduct our baseline analysis at the two-digit level. 
27
 In order to avoid estimating production functions with too few firms per industry, the production function parameters 
are still estimated at the two-digit level and only the frontier definition is applied at the 3 or 4 digit level. The median 
number of firms across two-digit sectors and years is about 2000, but this figure falls to 210 and 130 for 3 and 4 digit 
sectors respectively. When looking across country*industry*year cells, these medians are 53, 8 and 6, respectively for 
2, 3 and 4 digit industries. Thus, we chose the two-digit detail level as our benchmark, which is a compromise between 
avoiding too small cells and the appropriate differentiation across economic activities. 
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accompanied by divergence in revenues – or market shares – between frontier and laggard firms, 
Figure 2 (Panel A) shows that the gap in revenues has been growing over time: global frontier 
firms have gained significant market share relative to laggards in manufacturing and to a larger 
extent in services. In contrast, the average size of frontier firms and laggards in terms of 
employment show similar trends (Panel B). 
Second, these patterns appear to be particularly strong in sectors providing ICT services 
where cost advantages coming from the virtually zero-cost replication of information goods and 
business processes are reinforced with network externalities that favor the emergence of a few 
dominant players (e.g. providing a specific network, platform or standard). Figure 3, Panel A 
shows that divergence in revenues is particularly stark in ICT services compared to services 
outside the ICT segment. This divergence is also apparent within the global frontier grouping: the 
sales of firms in the top 2% of the global MFPR distribution grew by 14% on average in ICT 
services over the sample period, compared to 7% in other services.28 In comparison, the sales of 
the top 5% have grown by 6% and 3.5% in ICT and other services, respectively.  
Third, our results show a more pronounced MFP divergence in ICT services between 
frontier and laggard firms as well as within the global frontier grouping. Figure 3 (Panel B) shows 
that the rise in the MFPR gap is very pronounced in ICT services and especially so in data services 
(Panel C).29 Moreover, within the global frontier grouping, a small cadre of the most elite firms 
(top 2%) have become more productive relative to other frontier firms in ICT and data services, 
while this pattern is not evident for other services sectors. 
Table 2 illustrates the key findings on productivity divergence by means of firm-level 
regression results with appropriate fixed effect structures. The starting point for the specification 
is the following: 
𝑀𝐹𝑃𝑗𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽𝐹𝑗𝑖𝑡𝑇𝑡 + 𝜂𝑗𝐹 + 𝜀𝑗𝑖𝑡, (2) 
28
 Given the relative volatility of the sales data for firms in the top 2% of global MFPR distribution, we do not show 
these estimates for presentational reasons. 
29
 This is also in line with findings by Gamberoni, Giordano and Lopez-Garcia (2016) using alternative firm-level 
sources, which show strongest increases in capital-productivity dispersion in the ICT sector. Decker et al (2016) also 
confirm this for labor productivity for the US. 
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where 𝑀𝐹𝑃𝑗𝑖𝑡 stands for firm-level productivity in industry j for firm i in year t, 𝑇𝑡 is a linear time
trend and 𝐹𝑗𝑖𝑡 is binary variable capturing frontier status (1 - at the frontier; 0 - below the frontier). 𝜂𝑗𝐹 stands for a full set of fixed effects capturing each sector and frontier status (effectively,
interacting 𝐹𝑗𝑖𝑡 with sector fixed effects 𝜂𝑗) to control for the average difference between frontier 
and non-frontier firms separately for each sector, and 𝜀𝑗𝑖𝑡 is the error term. Based on the diverging 
patterns in Figure 1, a positive and significant 𝛽 coefficient is expected, implying that the 
productivity frontier shows a steeper positive trend than firms below the frontier. 
The specification in equation (2) is enriched so that we can directly test for differences in 
the degree of this divergence i) between services versus manufacturing (as shown in the right vs 
left panels of Figure 1 on the one hand, and ii) between ICT services and other services (as shown 
in Figure 3) on the other hand:30 
𝑀𝐹𝑃𝑗𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽𝐹𝑗𝑖𝑡𝑇𝑡 + 𝐷𝑆𝑒𝑟(𝛼𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽𝑆𝑒𝑟𝐹𝑗𝑖𝑡𝑇𝑡) + 𝐷𝐼𝑇(𝛼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽𝐼𝑇𝐹𝑗𝑖𝑡𝑇𝑡) +𝜂𝑗𝐹 + 𝜀𝑗𝑖𝑡 (3) 
where the subscripts 𝑆𝑒𝑟 and 𝐼𝑇 stands for services and IT related services, respectively, and 𝐷𝑆𝑒𝑟 = 1 if the sector belongs to services and 0 otherwise, and 𝐷𝐼𝑇 = 1 if the sector is IT services 
and 0 otherwise. In this formulation, 𝛽𝑆𝑒𝑟 > 0 indicates faster divergence in services between 
frontier and other firms than in manufacturing, and 𝛽𝐼𝑇 > 0 indicates that this divergence is even 
faster among data services (since 𝐷𝑆𝑒𝑟 = 1 for all services sectors, including IT services).  
Table 2 confirms the statistical and economic significance of the diverging pattern, 
showing less than 0.1% per year average growth for firms below the frontier and 2% per year 
growth of the frontier in manufacturing. This diverging trend is 1% per year faster in services and 
an additional 3% per year faster in data services. These figures are broadly similar for labor 
productivity (column 1) and variants of MFP (columns 2 and 3). The results are also qualitatively 
robust to different variations of defining the frontier: (i) using three-year moving averages of firm-
30
 Within ICT services, we focus on “Data services” which is sector 63 in ISIC Rev. 4 (“Information service activities”, 
comprising of “Data processing, hosting and related activities; web portals”) and it captures the type of activity that 
is most like to be characterized by zero marginal costs and winner-takes-all dynamics. Google, for instance, is 
classified in this sector. 
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productivity, to avoid the possibility that the frontier is growing simply due to the large and 
potentially increasing variance of year-to-year productivity changes (for instance, due to more and 
more concentration of output in certain years) and (ii) allowing the set of firms in the frontier group 
to vary over time with the sample (a time-varying 5%) (See Table A1 in Appendix A). 
We also test for further divergence at the very top of the productivity distribution and 
compare how this varies across sectors to see whether the patterns seen in Figure 3 are statistically 
significant. The following specification is estimated, where notations are the same as for equations 
(2) and (3): 
𝑀𝐹𝑃𝑗𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽𝐹𝑗𝑖𝑡10𝑇𝑡 + 𝛾𝐹𝑗𝑖𝑡5 𝑇𝑡 + 𝛿𝐹𝑗𝑖𝑡2 𝑇𝑡 + 𝜂𝑗𝐹 + 𝐹𝑗𝑖𝑡10 + 𝐹𝑗𝑖𝑡5 + 𝜀𝑗𝑖𝑡 (4) 
with 𝐹𝑗𝑖𝑡10  denoting the indicator for the firm being in the top 10% of the productivity distribution
in year t (within the firm’s industry), 𝐹𝑗𝑖𝑡5   and 𝐹𝑗𝑖𝑡2    similarly for being in the top 5% and top 2%,
respectively. This regression is estimated separately for manufacturing, services and IT services, 
and we expect to find positive and significant estimates for 𝛽 for all three cases, with positive and 
significant 𝛾 or 𝛿 for IT services. Indeed, there is strong and significant divergence at the top end 
of the distribution for IT services: the most productive 2% has a stronger divergence away from 
the segment just below, i.e. the top 5% excluding the top 2%, by 3.4% per annum for labor 
productivity and by 2.2% per annum for MFP (Table 3 columns 5 and 6). 
3.2. Slower catch-up and weakening market dynamism holding back firms below the 
frontier 
The rising gap in MFP between frontier and laggard firms could also signal stalling diffusion of 
technology and business practices, as well as sluggish market dynamism amongst laggards. To test 
whether the pace of productivity convergence has slowed over time, we estimate a model where 
firm level MFP growth depends on a firm’s lagged MFP gap with (or distance from) the global 
frontier. The empirical specification is based on the estimation of the Acemoglu, Aghion and 
Zilibotti (2006) framework, which has been implemented in a number of studies (e.g. Griffith, 
Redding and Simpson, 2009). In particular, the log of MFP is assumed to follow an error correction 
model of the following form: 
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𝛥𝑀𝐹𝑃𝑗𝑖𝑡 =∑ 𝛿𝑘𝑘 𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑗𝑖,𝑡−1𝐷𝑡𝑘 + 𝛾𝛥𝑀𝐹𝑃𝑗𝑡𝐹𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑟 +∑ 𝜙𝑚𝑚 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝑚 + 𝜂𝑐𝑡 + 𝜂𝑗 + 𝜀𝑗𝑖𝑡 (5) 
Productivity growth Δ𝑀𝐹𝑃𝑗𝑖𝑡 of firm i is expected to increase with the size of the 
productivity gap (hence 𝛿𝑘 > 0), which measures how far each firm is away from the frontier 𝑀𝐹𝑃𝑗𝑡𝐹𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑟 in industry j in which firm i operates:
𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑗𝑖𝑡 = 𝑀𝐹𝑃𝑗𝑡𝐹𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑟 −𝑀𝐹𝑃𝑗𝑖𝑡 .
We allow for the speed of productivity convergence to vary over time by including 
interaction terms of the speed of convergence 𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑗𝑖,𝑡−1𝐷𝑡𝑘, where 𝐷𝑡𝑘 is a dummy variable
corresponding to different time periods (i.e. 1997-2000, 2000-2002 … 2010-2014). If the pace of 
MFP convergence slowed over time, then we expect the 𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑗𝑖,𝑡−1𝐷𝑡 terms that belong to later 
periods to be significantly smaller than for earlier periods. The specification also includes a number 
of controls among 𝑋𝑚 – such as detailed firm size and firm age classes, included separately in the
baseline and interacted with the frontier growth and gap terms as an extension – as well as both 
industry 𝜂𝑗 and country*time fixed effects 𝜂𝑐𝑡. The standard errors are clustered by country and 
sector to allow for correlation of the error term in an unrestricted way across firms and time within 
sectors in the same country (Moulton, 1990). 
The main conclusions from these regressions are shown visually in Figure 4, while detailed 
results are presented in tables in Appendix C. They demonstrate that the pace of productivity 
convergence has indeed declined significantly over time. In particular, the estimated coefficient 
on the lagged MFP gap term 𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑗𝑖,𝑡−1 declined by almost 30% from the late 1990s to the most 
recent period, with most of the fall realized by 2007, that is, before the start of the crisis (Appendix 
C, Table C1). The decline in the speed of catch-up is even more pronounced when the model is 
estimated using markup corrected MFPR (Figure 4 Panel B). This pattern holds when controlling 
for the different speed of catch-up by firm size and age or when using a richer set of fixed effects 
(interacted industry - year) that absorb the frontier terms in equation (5) hence do not depend on 
the exact measurement of the frontier (Appendix C, Table C2 and Table C3, respectively). 
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One symptom of stalling diffusion could be the increasing persistence of incumbents at the 
frontier, or that entry to the frontier increasingly comes from firms already close to it (i.e. within 
the top decile or top quintile of the distribution). We might also expect these patterns to be 
especially evident in the services sector where intangibles and tacit knowledge are becoming ever 
more important and where the increase in market power at the frontier is most apparent. 
Indeed, in the beginning of the 2000s (2001-2003), half of MFPR-frontier firms in the 
services sector were made up from firms previously at the frontier or close to it (See Appendix C, 
Table C4, Panel A). More specifically, 48.3% of them were classified as frontier firms one year 
earlier according to our definition (top 5%), while 62% (68.8%) of them came from the top decile 
(quintile). By 2011-2013, however, these figures had risen to 55.2%, 71.1% and 77.4%, 
respectively. These patterns – which are also evident for mark-up corrected MFP, and to a lesser 
extent among manufacturing firms – suggest that it has become more difficult for laggard firms 
outside the top quintile of the MFP distribution to enter the top 5% frontier group. 
Rising entrenchment at the frontier is consistent with the broader decline in business 
dynamism (entry and exit rates) observed across OECD countries (Decker et al, 2014 for the US 
and Criscuolo, Gal and Menon, 2014 for 18 countries). To explore the role of market dynamism 
more directly among laggard firms, Figure 5 distinguishes between four groups of firms: i) young 
firms (aged 0-5 years) to proxy for recent entrants; ii) mature firms (aged 6 to 10 years); iii) firms 
that should be close to exit in a competitive market, proxied by non-viable firms older than 10 
years (those that record negative profits over at least two consecutive years); and iv) all other firms 
(i.e. viable old firms; the excluded category). Two key patterns emerge. First, firm turnover has 
fallen, as reflected by a decline in the share of young firms and a higher survival probability of 
marginal firms that would typically exit in a competitive market (Panel A).31 Second, the average 
productivity of recent entrants relative to viable incumbent firms has risen, while the average 
productivity of firms on the margin of exit has fallen over time (Panel B). Indeed, the decline in 
firm turnover coupled with an increase in the implied productivity gap between entering and 
31
 We use these categories to have a more robust picture of market dynamism and selection instead of working directly 
with entry and exit rates. They tend to be more volatile and noisy, in particular because our sample contains only those 
firms which have at least 20 employees on average over their observed lifespan. Also, the incidence of non-viable 
firms is likely to be understated since we compute them for the sample where MFP is available, and this excludes 
cases with negative value added, i.e. firms that have larger negative profits (in absolute value) than labor costs. For a 
more detailed analysis on the rise of non-viable firms, see Adalet McGowan et al (2018). 
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exiting businesses is what one would typically observe if barriers to entry had risen (Bartelsman, 
Haltiwanger and Scarpetta, 2009). 
3.3. Divergence across firms and aggregate productivity growth 
Aggregate productivity growth was slowing during the period for which we document productivity 
divergence. However, divergence in itself can be related to either faster or slower aggregate 
productivity growth. Indeed, if the frontier is growing faster, its contribution to aggregate 
productivity can increase, especially if the frontier also becomes relatively larger over time.32 On 
the other hand, a weakening performance of firms below the frontier may result in lower aggregate 
productivity, either through slower catch-up or through weaker market selection, as the previous 
section illustrated. 
Which of the two forces dominates is an empirical question. To test whether divergence 
and weak aggregate productivity growth performance are systematically linked, we exploit the 
cross-sectional (industry-level) variation in divergence and productivity growth33. We run the 
following baseline regression at the global industry-year level with aggregate industry productivity 
(𝑀𝐹𝑃𝑗𝑡𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒) growth as the dependent variable and the speed of divergence (the change in the
productivity gap from the frontier, 𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑗𝑡 = 𝑀𝐹𝑃𝑗𝑡𝐹𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑟 −𝑀𝐹𝑃̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑗𝑡𝐵𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑤𝐹𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑟) as the explanatory 
variable:  
𝛥𝑙𝑑𝑀𝐹𝑃𝑗𝑡𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒 = 𝛽𝛥𝑙𝑑𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑗𝑡 + 𝜂𝑗 + 𝜂𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗𝑡, (6) 
where 𝛥𝑙𝑑 denotes the long-difference operator (over 5-years in the baseline), 𝜂𝑗  and 𝜂𝑡  denote
industry and year fixed effects, 𝑀𝐹𝑃̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑗𝑡𝐵𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑤𝐹𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑟 represents the average MFP of firms below the
frontier in industry j and year t, and all productivity measures are expressed in logs. A negative 
estimate for 𝛽 would indicate that in industries where divergence is stronger, productivity growth 
32
 Figure 2 suggests that the frontier group does not become larger in terms of employment: the pace of employment 
growth is roughly similar both at the frontier and below it. 
33
 Relying only on the time series at the aggregate level would restrict us to very few data points. 
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is weaker, conditional on time-varying global factors (captured by 𝜂𝑡 ) and industry-specific trends
(captured by 𝜂𝑗 , considering that the variables in the regressions are growth rates).
We run this regression in several variants, defining the frontier and below frontier values 
based on the mean of log-productivity across firms (columns 1 and 3) or the median (columns 2 
and 4), and using either MFP or labor productivity growth as dependent variable (columns 3 and 
4). We define global industry aggregate MFP by weighting firm-level log MFP by a composite 
input index exp (?̂?𝐾𝑗𝑘𝑖𝑡 + ?̂?𝐿𝑗𝑙𝑖𝑡), using the industry specific coefficient estimates for capital and 
labor elasticities from equation (1). Analogously, we define aggregate labor productivity by 
weighting up firm-level labor productivity using employment weights. 
As Table 4 shows, there is a significant negative relationship between the increase in the 
productivity gap and aggregate productivity growth. This result is robust to i) changing the length 
of the period over which the gap changes and aggregate growth rates are defined (from 5 years to 
either 4 or 6 years), ii) to using an alternative definition of the frontier, iii) generally, also to 
defining the gap based on labor productivity instead of MFP (Table D1-Table D3 in Appendix D). 
Finally, the result is also robust to including the relative size of the frontier, with only a slightly 
weaker negative relationship and an insignificant term for the relative size variable, suggesting 
that changing allocative efficiency between the frontier and other firms is not an important part of 
the story (Table D4 in Appendix D). The relationship between firm level divergence and aggregate 
productivity growth is also economically significant: multiplying the coefficient estimate of -0.244 
(Table 4, column 1) with the average pace of divergence – about 2.3 percentage point per year 
(from Figure 1, Panel B) –, we obtain that on average the divergence is associated with 0.6 
percentage point lower productivity growth per year. Overall, these results imply that there is a 
sizable and robust negative relationship between the productivity divergence across firms and 
aggregate productivity growth during the 2000s. 
4. The Role of Regulatory Policy
Some degree of MFP divergence across firms may be organic to the working of a market economy, 
particularly during the spreading phase of a general purpose technology such as ICT when 
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experimentation looms large and it may be difficult for some firms to follow the best practice. Yet, 
the increase in the MFP gap, which is not uniform across sectors, is particularly pronounced in 
service sectors, and not only those related to ICT activities (Figure 3). Services are typically more 
sheltered from competitive pressures due to lower exposure to international competition and more 
stringent regulatory policies.  
There are a number of channels through which pro-competitive product market reforms 
can strengthen the incentives for laggard firms to adopt frontier technologies, thereby moderating 
MFP divergence. Indeed, a range of firm-level evidence generally supports the idea that 
competitive pressures are a driver of productivity-enhancing innovation and adoption.34 Building 
on these findings, we present evidence below that the rise in the MFP gap was less pronounced in 
sectors where the pace of product market reform was more intense.  
4.1. Measuring product market reforms 
To measure deregulations and pro-competitive reforms in product markets, we utilize a country-
sector database on product market regulations (PMR). It is based on a detailed survey of 
government regulations collected by the OECD and has been used in academic contexts as a 
measure of anti-competitive regulation (e.g. Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 2003). The indicators derived 
from the answers are scaled on a range from 0 to 6, where higher values indicate more restrictive 
regulations. 
The rationale of the PMR indicators is to capture the extent of “anti-competitive” 
regulations; that is, regulations “that inhibit competition in markets where competition is viable” 
(Conway and Nicoletti, 2003). The restrictions to competition captured by the PMR were defined 
either as barriers to access markets that are inherently competitive or as government interferences 
with market mechanisms in areas in which there are no obvious reasons why those should not be 
operating freely (e.g. price controls imposed in competitive industries as road freight or retail 
distribution). An important feature of these indicators is their de jure nature – i.e. they focus on 
rules and regulations as they appear in legislation. This is an advantage since it facilitates cross-
34
 Inter alia, see Nickell (1996); Blundell, Griffith and Van Reenen, (1999); Haskel, Pereira and Slaughter (2007). 
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country comparisons, but may come at the cost of effectively accounting for differences in 
implementation and enforcement across countries. 
We exploit information on sector-specific regulation in 10 separate industries: 7 in network 
industries, 1 in retail, and 2 in professional services (see Conway and Nicoletti, 2006). Network 
industries include two energy sectors (electricity and gas), three transport sectors (road, rail and 
air) and two communication sectors (post and telecommunications). The two professional services 
industries refer to the business services sector (accounting and legal services) and the technical 
services sector (engineering and architecture services). The indicator captures different aspects of 
regulation, depending on the specific sector considered. For network industries, the indicator is 
largely about the organization of network access to potential service providers. For retail trade, it 
typically takes the form of entry barriers, specific restrictions for large firms and the flexibility of 
shops in terms of opening hours and prices. As for professional services, it focuses on barriers to 
entry and the way services are delivered and includes, amongst others, rules governing the 
recognition of qualifications and the determination of fees and prices.35 
4.2. Empirical strategy 
This section lays out the empirical strategy for testing whether PMR affects the productivity gap 
between frontier and non-frontier firms. We estimate the following baseline specification for the 
10 market services sectors for which regulatory indicators are available over the period 1998-
2013:36 
𝛥𝑙𝑑𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑐𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽𝛥𝑙𝑑𝑃𝑀𝑅𝑐𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾𝛥𝑙𝑑𝐸𝑐𝑗𝑡 + 𝜈𝑐 + 𝜇𝑠 + 𝛿[𝑐]𝑡 + 𝜀𝑐𝑗𝑡 (7) 
35
 For retail and professional services industries, where the OECD PMR indicators are updated only every 5 years 
(1998, 2003, 2008, 2013), additional information was used on the timing of reforms. See details in Gal and Hijzen 
(2016) and in Appendix E. 
36
 Throughout the analysis of PMR’s impact on the productivity gap, the coverage is restricted to cases where the 
annual PMR indicators are available and where at least 10 firms are present in Orbis. The included 14 OECD countries 
are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Korea, Portugal Slovenia, Spain, Sweden 
and the United Kingdom. 
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where Δld denotes the long difference operator, corresponding to five years in the baseline 
specification;37 𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑐𝑗𝑡 refers to the difference between the (unweighted) average MFP (MFPR or
markup corrected MFPR) of global frontier firms and the (unweighted) average MFP of laggard 
firms in country c, industry j and year t.38 PMRcjt refers to the overall restrictiveness of product 
market regulation in key service industries (expressed in log terms),39 which is increasing in the 
degree of regulation. Throughout the period analysed, there is a general decline in the 
restrictiveness of product market regulation (𝛥𝑙𝑑𝑃𝑀𝑅𝑐𝑗𝑡 < 0) . Thus an estimated 𝛽 > 0 implies
that a slowdown in pro-competitive product market reforms (i.e. a smaller decline in PMR) is 
associated with a rising MFP gap between the global frontier and non-frontier firms. 
The regression also includes the growth of sectoral employment (E) to control for both 
time-varying shocks within country*industry pairs and potential changes in the coverage of the 
dataset.40 The baseline model includes separate country, industry and year fixed effects to control 
for omitted time-invariant country (𝜈𝑐) and industry (𝜇𝑗) trends (given the specification in long 
differences) – and common global shocks (𝛿𝑡). As an extension, we include interacted country-
year fixed effects (𝛿𝑐𝑡) to control for country-specific time-varying shocks (different trends and 
business cycles). To maximize the use of the data, we rely on overlapping five-year differences 
(e.g. 2013-2008, 2012-2007 etc.) but given that we cluster at the country-industry pair level this is 
innocuous (e.g. Bloom, Draca and Van Reenen, 2016). Finally, country-industry-year cells that 
contain less than 10 firms are excluded in order to reduce the influence of highly idiosyncratic 
firm-level developments. 
One identification concern is that rigid services regulation might be a consequence, not a 
cause of the MFP gap between the global productivity frontier and non-frontier domestic firms. 
This would be the case if there were greater incentives for domestic firms to exert political 
37
 As discussed below, the significance of the results are not sensitive to the choice of the length of the long-
differencing window. 
38
 As robustness checks, the medians instead of the means will also be used. 
39
 Taking the log of PMR is a useful transformation to the extent that it allows for reforms to be evaluated in relative 
terms, in relation to the pre-reform policy stance. This is particularly relevant as in many industries the strictness of 
regulation, as expressed by the PMR indicator, is already at low levels, and there is limited scope for further reforms 
that lead to a similar reduction in absolute terms in the indicator than in the past. 
40
 The employment variable is based on information from the Orbis database, and is calculated as the average of log 
employment levels across firms. 
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pressures for raising anti-competitive regulations when the productivity gap is larger. Such 
lobbying activity by inefficient firms would upwardly bias the estimate of β. However, to the extent 
that MFP is pro-cyclical – and thus the gap from the global frontier is countercyclical –, and 
product market reforms are conducted when domestic economic conditions are weak (Bouis, 
Duval and Eugster, 2016), the estimated β would be biased in the opposite direction. 
We adopt two additional identification strategies to confront the potential endogeneity of 
market regulation to economic conditions. In particular, we employ instrumental variables (IV) 
that exploit the existence of liberalization waves across countries and the role of external pressure 
in driving them (see Bouis, Duval and Eugster, 2016). Specifically, we utilize two instruments that 
are unlikely to be affected by sector-level economic outcomes in the country considered, and 
should not have any effect on 𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑐𝑗𝑡 other than through pressure on domestic authorities to 
undertake reform. First, we rely on “Reform pressure”, that is, the lagged level of market 
regulation, based on the idea that the scope for reform as well as the push to implement reform is 
larger the in country-sector pairs where the initial stance of product market regulation is stricter. 
Second, we also utilize the idea of “Reform waves” or “Relative reform pressure”, which we 
defined as reform activity in all other countries in the sample – as measured by the 5-year change 
in product market regulation in the given sector – to capture peer pressure from reforms in other 
countries. These peer pressures could arise due to competitiveness concerns by policymakers if 
they observe a restrictive regulatory framework in their country but a strong reform activity in 
others. 
4.3. Results 
Table 5 summarizes our main estimation results based on variants of equation (7) for the MFP gap 
based on MFPR and markup corrected MFP for the services sectors affected by product market 
regulation. As a starting specification, column 1 contains additive country, industry and year fixed 
effects, while starting from column 2, the regressions include instead country-year fixed effects to 
control for time varying country-specific shocks (e.g. business cycle effects) and separate industry 
fixed effects. Column 3 uses markup corrected MFP, while the last two columns instrument the 
regulatory reform, either by the initial stance of regulations (column 4) or by the average reform 
intensity in all other countries (column 5). In each case, the change in the MFP gap is positively 
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and significantly related to the change in PMR. The IV estimates are larger in magnitude than the 
baseline estimates, although less precisely estimated, suggesting that weak sectoral performance 
may trigger market reforms, as opposed to lobbying for anti-competitive regulation. The results 
are robust to using alternative lengths of the long difference operator (Table E2 in the Appendix 
E) or the median (rather than mean) productivity of laggards to construct the MFP gap (Table E3).
The coefficient estimates in Column 1 of Table 5 and the descriptive statistics in Table D5 
imply that a one standard deviation increase in PMR is associated with about one-third of a 
standard deviation increase in the MFP gap. To further illustrate the economic magnitude, we 
perform a simple counterfactual simulation that answers the question: how much the MFP gap 
would have risen if market reforms in five key services sectors had proceeded at the same pace of 
that observed in telecommunications, where reform was most extensive. Taking legal and 
accounting services as an example, we find that the MFP gap increased at an annual average rate 
of 3.8% over the sample period, and our estimates imply that 1.7 percentage points (45%) of this 
increase may have been avoided if liberalization in this sector had accelerated more rapidly. On 
average across the sectors analyzed, the divergence that is attributed to slow deregulation amounts 
to about 40%. 
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we aimed to contribute to the debate on the global productivity slowdown – which 
has by and large been conducted from a macroeconomic perspective – from a more micro 
perspective. We provided new firm level evidence that highlights the importance of separately 
considering what happens to the frontier as well as to laggard (non-frontier) firms. The most 
striking feature of the productivity slowdown was found to be not so much a slowing in the rate of 
productivity growth at the global frontier, but rather a dynamic improvement of productivity at the 
global frontier coupled with an increasing productivity divergence between this frontier and the 
rest of the distribution. This productivity divergence remains after controlling for differences in 
capital deepening and markup behavior although there is evidence that market power of frontier 
firms has increased in services. This led us to suspect that the rising MFPR gap between global 
frontier and laggard firms may in fact reflect technological divergence. This may help reconcile 
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views of techno-optimists, which emphasize the fast pace of technological innovations (probably 
pushed by frontier firms) with sluggish aggregate productivity figures, which are being held back 
by a slowing diffusion of these innovations or more generally business practices to the majority of 
(non-frontier) firms. 
We also showed that this pattern of MFP divergence is happening while entrenchment at 
the top is increasing and entry and exit are slowing down. In addition, we report evidence that 
catch-up by laggards has also slowed down during the same period. Interestingly, the divergence 
is stronger in services and even more so in digital intensive sectors, where productivity divergence 
has also become apparent amongst the very top firms as well.   
Digitalization can indeed contribute to rapid productivity gains at the global frontier, 
especially in knowledge intensive services, through reduced marginal costs and concomitant 
winner-takes-all dynamics. Yet, aggregate MFP growth was significantly slower in industries 
where MFP divergence was more pronounced, suggesting that the divergence observed is not 
solely driven by frontier firm pushing the boundary outward. In this regard, we contend that 
increasing MFP divergence – and the global productivity slowdown more generally – could reflect 
a slowdown in the technological diffusion process, as also confirmed by the slowing rate of catch-
up. As suggested by recent theories, this could be a reflection of increasing adoption costs for 
laggards firms due to the increasing role of complementary intangible investments that modern 
technologies require (management, organizational changes, etc.). But it could also be symptomatic 
of rising entry barriers and a decline in the contestability of markets. Crucially, in both cases, there 
is scope for policy to alleviate the productivity slowdown. 
Indeed, we found the rise in MFP divergence to be much more extreme in sectors where 
pro-competitive product market reforms were least extensive, suggesting that the observed rise in 
MFP divergence could be at least partly due to policy weakness stifling diffusion. Put differently, 
structural changes in the global economy meant that technological catch-up to the global 
productivity frontier became more difficult for the typical firm over the 2000s, but these difficulties 
were compounded by policy weakness. From this perspective, the opportunity cost of poorly 
designed product market regulations may have risen over time. 
This research raises a number of issues for future research. First, it would be interesting to 
explore the impact of the crisis and macroeconomic policies on global frontier and laggard firms, 
via the channels identified in Anzoategui et al (forthcoming) and Gopinath et al (2017). Second, 
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containing MFP divergence may carry a double-dividend both for productivity and equity, given 
the positive correlation between wages and productivity across firms, and to the extent that the 
observed rise in wage inequality is closely related to cross-firm inequality in firm-average wages 
(Song et al, 2018).  
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Table 1 
Firm characteristics: firms at the frontier vs. below the frontier 
A: Labor productivity based frontier definition 
 
B: MFP based frontier definition 
 
Notes: Productivity is measured in logs, and productivity denotes the measure mentioned in the 
panel titles (labor productivity, MFP for panel A and B, respectively). In 2013. See details in 
Section 1 for the calculation of the frontier and the productivity measures. Notation for p-values: 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
1: in thousands of 2005 USD; 2: in millions of 2005 USD; both using PPP conversions.  
Sector
Frontier status Below frontier
At the 
frontier
Below 
frontier
At the 
frontier
Variable Mean Mean Sign. Mean Mean Sign.
st.dev. st.dev. diff. st.dev. st.dev. diff.
Productivity 10.7 12.0 *** 12.0 11.9 ***
(0.6) (0.4) (0.7) (0.7)
Employees 49.3 45.1 *** 59.5 38.0 ***
(52.1) (33.8) (156.6) (24.8)
Capital-labour ratio 1 86.1 274.5 *** 12.5 49.4 ***
(115.3) (425.5) (32) (169.2)
Revenues 2 11.8 39.0 *** 1.1 3.8 ***
(21.6) (58.8) (2.2) (9.2)
Markup (log) 0.05 0.10 *** 0.07 0.26 ***
(0.4) (0.4) (0.4) (0.5)
Wages 1 31.0 49.4 *** 12.3 27.1 ***
(15.1) (18.2) (20) (37.9)
Number of firms 21,191   825 22,053  627
Manufacturing Services
Sector
Frontier status Below frontier
At the 
frontier
Below 
frontier
At the 
frontier
Variable Mean Mean Sign. Mean Mean Sign.
st.dev. st.dev. diff. st.dev. st.dev. diff.
Productivity 10.4 11.6 *** 11.6 11.7 ***
(0.6) (0.4) (0.7) (0.7)
Employees 48.3 73.7 *** 59.1 53.4
(46.8) (126) (155.3) (115.6)
Capital-labour ratio 1 89.3 214.3 *** 12.7 16.5 ***
(125.1) (406) (32.6) (75.6)
Revenues 2 11.5 50.5 *** 1.1 5.1 ***
(19.9) (74.1) (2.2) (13.1)
Markup (log) 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.20 ***
(0.4) (0.4) (0.4) (0.5)
Wages 1 31.0 51.0 *** 12.3 27.6 ***
(15.1) (17.1) (20) (37.7)
Number of firms 21,317   706 22,147  538
Manufacturing Services
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Table 2 
The frontier is growing significantly faster than the rest,  
more strongly in services and especially data services 
 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the level of log-productivity, and the frontier status is defined as 
being in the top 5% of the productivity distribution, within each industry and year. See equation 
(3) for the exact formulation. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the industry level. 
Notation for p-values: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Productivity measure as 
dependent variable
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3)
Trend 0.009* 0.008* 0.011**
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Frontier X Trend 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.018***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Services X Trend -0.012** -0.011** -0.015**
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Services X Frontier X Trend 0.011** 0.009** 0.008*
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Data Services X Trend 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.021***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Data Services X Frontier X Trend 0.030*** 0.026*** 0.024***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
R-squared 0.370 0.496 0.306
Industry X Frontier status FEs Yes Yes Yes
Observations 870,141 870,588 870,588
Labour 
productivity
MFP Markup 
corrected MFP
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Table 3 
The top of the distribution is diverging faster in services, especially in data 
services 
Note: The dependent variable is the level of log-productivity, and the frontier is defined as 
described in the main text. See equation (4) for the exact formulation. Standard errors (in 
parentheses) are clustered at the industry level. Notation for p-values: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1 
Sectors
Productivity measures Labour productivity MFP
Labour 
productivity MFP
Labour 
productivity MFP
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
trend 0.008* 0.008 -0.003 -0.002 0.018*** 0.018***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Top10% X trend 0.017*** 0.019*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.050*** 0.044***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Top5% X trend 0.001* 0.001 0.003 0.002* -0.003 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.005)
Top2% X trend 0.002 0.000 0.005** 0.003** 0.034*** 0.022**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.009) (0.009)
Industry X frontier status FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.380 0.446 0.496 0.631 0.356 0.351
Observations 385,504 385,644    484,637 484,944 3,137        3,138 
Manufacturing Services Data services
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Table 4 
Productivity divergence and aggregate productivity growth: a negative 
relationship 
Aggregate productivity regressed on the productivity gap (long-differences over 5 years) 
Notes: All variables are measured in log differences over overlapping five-years. Standard errors 
are clustered at the industry level. The productivity gap is defined using firm-level MFP 
(Wooldridge, 2009, methodology) and is calculated as the difference in mean productivity at and 
below the frontier (columns 1 and 3) or as the difference in median productivity in the two 
segments of firms (columns 2 and 4). The frontier is defined as the set of firms with the top 5% 
productivity level within each detailed industry and in each year (see details in Section 1). The 
sample covers 54 industries and 23 countries over 2001-2013 (see details in Appendix D). Notation 
for p-values: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Dependent variable: 
aggregate productivity measure
Productivity gap measure variant: Mean Median Mean Median
Explanatory variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Δ Productivity gap -0.244*** -0.273*** -0.227** -0.256***
(0.090) (0.068) (0.097) (0.080)
R-squared 0.681 0.698 0.558 0.571
Industry and year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 432 432 432 432
Δ Labour productivityΔ MFP
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Table 5 
Product market reforms and productivity divergence 
 
 
Note: Regression results based on equation (7). Cluster robust standard errors (at the country-
industry level) are in parentheses. Notation for p-values: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1Both the 
MFP gap and the PMR indicator are measured in log terms. The MFP gap is calculated at the 
country-industry-year level, by taking the difference between the global frontier and the 
unweighted average of log productivity of non-frontier firms. The time period is 1998-2013. In 
column 4, ΔPMR (denoting a five-year difference in PMR) is instrumented by the lagged level of 
PMR (in t-5), while in column 5, ΔPMR for a given country is instrumented by the average 5-year 
change in PMR in the given sector across all other countries in the sample. The instrumental 
variable is highly significant with the expected signs in the first-stage equation. 
  
Dependent variable:
Δ Mark-up 
corrected 
MFP gap
Estimation method: OLS OLS OLS IV IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
0.205*** 0.231*** 0.311** 0.338* 0.676***
(0.065) (0.083) (0.132) (0.194) (0.179)
Industry fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES
Country fixed effects YES NO NO NO NO
Year fixed effects YES NO NO NO NO
Country X year fixed effects NO YES YES YES YES
R-squared 0.201 0.323 0.463 0.318 0.235
Observations 458 458 376 458 458
Δ MFP gap 
Δ Product Market 
Regulations,c,t
Δ MFP gap 
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Figure 1 
Divergence between the frontier and the rest 
A: Labor productivity 
 
B: Multi-factor productivity (MFP) 
 
C: Markup corrected MFP 
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Note: The global frontier is measured by the average of log productivity for the top 5% of 
companies with the highest productivity levels within each two-digit industry. Firms below the 
frontier capture the average log productivity of all the other firms. Unweighted averages across 
two-digit industries are shown for manufacturing and services, normalized to 0 in the starting year. 
The time period is 2001-2013. The vertical axes represent log-point differences from the starting 
year: for instance, the frontier in manufacturing has a value of about 0.3 in the final year, which 
corresponds to approximately 30% higher in productivity in 2013 compared to 2001. Services refer 
to non-financial business sector services.  
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Figure 2 
Is the frontier getting bigger? 
A: Divergence in revenues 
B: No divergence in employment 
Note: the global frontier group of firms is defined by the top 5% of companies  with the highest 
productivity levels, measured by markup corrected MFPR within each two-digit industry.  
Laggards capture all the other firms.  Unweighted averages across two-digit industries are shown 
for log revenues and log employment, for Panels A and B, respectively, separately for 
manufacturing and services, normalized to 0 in the starting year. MFPR uses the Wooldridge 
(2009) methodology based production function estimation, while the markup estimation used for 
corrected MFPR uses the De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) methodology. Time period is 2001-
2013. Services refer to non-financial business services. 
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Figure 3 
Evidence on “Winner-takes-all” dynamics 
A: Divergence in revenues, especially in ICT services 
B: Divergence in MFP: stronger in ICT services, especially within the top 
C: Divergence in MFP: especially strong in data services, more so at the very top 
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Notes: ICT services refer to the “Information and communication” sector (industry code J in 
NACE Rev. 2) and “Postal and courier activities” (53). Data services refer to the “Information 
service activities” sector (63). For more details see the notes of Figure 1. Since the figures are 
depicted as within-sector differences, the evolution of revenues can be interpreted as changes in 
the relative market shares for frontier and other firms. 
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Figure 4 
The pace of convergence slowed, especially before the crisis 
Estimated convergence parameters by time-periods 
Note: The lines show the evolution over time of the estimated 𝛿𝑘 coefficient from the firm level 
MFP growth regression (equation (5)), presented in Table C1 of Appendix C (Column 1), while 
the dashed lines provide the 95% confidence interval around these coefficient estimates. 
A: MFP B: Mark-up corrected MFP
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Figure 5 
Indicators of declining market dynamism amongst firms below the frontier 
A: The share different types (in % of the total sample) 
B: Relative MFP levels of different types of firms (in %; old viable firms = 100%) 
Note: The figures show the shares (panel A) and the relative productivity (panel B) of three groups 
of firms: firms aged 5 years or less (young firms), firms aged 6 to 10 years (mature firms) and 
firms older than 10 years that record negative profits over at least two consecutive years (non-
viable old firms). The omitted group are firms older than 10 years that do not record negative 
profits over at least two consecutive years (viable old firms). The age of the firm is calculated 
using the incorporation date as recorded in the database. The estimates are unweighted averages 
across industries in the non-farm non-financial business sector. 
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Appendix A: Firm-level Productivity Divergence: Robustness 
This Appendix presents a series of robustness checks for the diverging pattern of firm-level 
productivity across the most productive and other firms. 
Table A1 
Robustness of divergence regressions to variations in the definition of the frontier 
A. Variable number of firms at the frontier 
Productivity measure as 
dependent variable
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3)
Trend 0.008* 0.008 0.010**
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Frontier X Trend 0.014*** 0.015*** 0.014***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Services X Trend -0.013** -0.012** -0.016***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Services X Frontier X Trend -0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Data Services X Trend 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.021***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Data Services X Frontier X Trend 0.028*** 0.024*** 0.017***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
R-squared 0.371 0.497 0.306
Industry X Frontier status FEs Yes Yes Yes
Observations 870,141 870,588 870,588
MFP Markup 
corrected MFP 
Labour 
productivity
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B. Smoothed firm-level productivity measures (using a 3-year moving average) 
Notes: The dependent variable is the level of log-productivity, and the frontier is defined as 
described in the main text, with the following exceptions: in Panel A the number of firms in the 
top 5% group varies with the sample and not fixed over time, in Panel B, productivity is replaced 
by its 3-year moving average. See equation (3) for the exact formulation in Section IV. Standard 
errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the 2-digit industry level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Productivity measure as 
dependent variable
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3)
Trend 0.003 0.001 0.003
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Frontier X Trend 0.024*** 0.025*** 0.025***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Services X Trend -0.007 -0.006 -0.008
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Services X Frontier X Trend 0.010** 0.007 0.004
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
Data Services X Trend 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.018***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Data Services X Frontier X Trend 0.043*** 0.033*** 0.028***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
R-squared 0.403 0.544 0.347
Industry X Frontier status FEs Yes Yes Yes
Observations 521,868 522,113 522,113
MFP Markup 
corrected MFP
Labour 
productivity
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Figure A1 
Divergence: firm-level patterns vs industry aggregate productivity  
from national accounts 
 
A: Business Sector 
 
 
B: Manufacturing        C: Services 
 
Notes: The global frontier is measured by the average of log labor productivity (value added over 
employees) for the top 5% of companies with the highest productivity levels within each two-digit 
industry. Laggards capture the average log productivity of all the other firms. Unweighted averages 
across two-digit industries are shown for manufacturing and services, normalized to 0 in the 
starting year. Services refer to non-financial, non-real estate business services (industry codes 45-
82, excluding 64-68, in NACE Rev.2.). The business sector denotes manufacturing and services. 
The sectoral data refers to aggregate log labor productivity (value added over total employment), 
averaged across countries and industries at the two-digit detail (unweighted). In cases the two-digit 
details are not available, higher level industry groups are used. The industry level aggregates are 
employment weighted averages of all companies and self-employed businesses within the two-
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digit industries, whereas the firm-level information is an unweighted average of companies with 
at least 20 employees. 
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Figure A2 
Divergence: decomposing the labor productivity frontier by MFPR and capital intensity 
 
A: Labor productivity* 
 
B: MFPR 
 
C: Capital intensity (K/L) 
 
Notes: The frontier and non-frontier groups are based on labor productivity. Unweighted averages 
across two-digit industries are shown for the Wooldridge (2009) type production-function based 
log MFPR measure and the log of real capital stock over employment for Panels A and B, 
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respectively, separately for manufacturing and services, normalized to 0 in the starting year. Time 
period is 2001-2013.  The sample is restricted to those companies that have data available to 
measure capital stock and MFP. *Labor productivity is repeating that of Figure A2 but restricted 
to a common sample with MFPR and capital intensity. 
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Figure A3 
Divergence: decomposing the MFPR frontier by markups and markup corrected MFPR 
 
A: Markups 
 
B: Markup corrected MFPR 
 
Notes: The frontier and non-frontier groups are based on MFPR (Wooldridge, 2009) productivity. 
Unweighted averages across two-digit industries are shown for the log of markups (De Loecker 
and Warzynski, 2012) based on employment as variable input (Panel A). Markup corrected MFPR 
is shown in Panel B, and is defined as the difference between MFPR and markups (both measured 
in logs; see Section 1). Time period is 2001-2013. 
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Figure A4 
Divergence: alternative labor productivity definition 
 
Labor productivity: operating revenues per worker 
 
Notes: The global frontier is measured by the average of log labor productivity (measured as 
revenue per worker) for the top 5% of companies with the highest productivity levels within each 
two-digit industry. Laggards capture the average log productivity of all the other firms. 
Unweighted averages across two-digit industries are shown for manufacturing and services, 
normalized to 0 in the starting year. Services refer to non-financial business services. Time period 
is 2001-2013. 
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Figure A5 
Divergence: alternative frontier definitions 
 
A: Frontier – 10% most productive firms within each sector 
 
B: Frontier – 50 most productive firms within each sector 
 
C: Frontier – 100 most productive firms within each sector 
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Notes: The global frontier is measured by the average of log labor productivity (value added per 
worker) for the top 10% of, top 50 and top 100 companies with the highest productivity levels 
within each two-digit industry, in Panel A, B and C, respectively. Laggards capture the average 
log productivity of all the other firms. Unweighted averages across two-digit industries are shown 
for manufacturing and services, normalized to 0 in the starting year. Services refer to non-financial 
business services. Time period is 2001-2013. 
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Figure A6 
Divergence: excluding subsidiaries that are part of a group 
 
A: Labor productivity: value added per worker 
 
B: MFPR 
 
C: Markup corrected MFPR 
 
Notes: See notes below Figure 1. These figures retain only the consolidated accounts of the 
ultimate owners (headquarters) of groups or standalone firms that are not part of any group. Firms 
with an unknown status are omitted, leading to a substantial reduction in sample size. The available 
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ownership link structure in Orbis may not be complete, especially for earlier years. Time period is 
2001-2013. 
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Figure A7 
Divergence: alternative MFPR definitions 
A: MFP – Solow 
 
B: MFPR – Wooldridge (2009) gross-output based production function 
 
C: MFPR – Wooldridge (2009) labor costs as labor inputs in the production function 
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Notes: The global frontier is measured by the average of the log of an index-number based Solow 
residual MFP measure (using OECD National Accounts wage shares and assuming constant 
returns to scale; Panel A); a residual from a gross-output based Wooldridge (2009) production 
function estimation (Panel B); using labor costs as labor inputs in our baseline Wooldridge (2009) 
production function approach to capture changing labor quality and hours worked. For all of these 
measures, the top 5% of companies with the highest MFP levels within each two-digit industry is 
defined as the frontier. Laggards capture the average log productivity of all the other firms. 
Unweighted averages across two-digit industries are shown for manufacturing and services, 
normalized to 0 in the starting year. Services refer to non-financial business services. Time period 
is 2001-2013. 
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Figure A8 
Divergence: markup corrected MFP using materials as flexible inputs 
A: Markup 
B: Markup corrected MFPR 
Notes: The global frontier is measured by top 5% of companies with the highest Wooldridge 
(2009) production function estimation based productivity levels (MFPR) within each two-digit 
industry. Laggards capture the average log productivity of all the other firms. Panel A shows the 
average level of (log) markups and Panel B the average level of markup corrected MFPR for these 
two groups. The markup estimation uses the De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) methodology. 
Unweighted averages across two-digit industries are shown for manufacturing and services, 
normalized to 0 in the starting year. Services refer to non-financial business services. Time period 
is 2001-2013. 
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Figure A9 
Labor productivity divergence within more narrowly defined industries 
A: 3-digit industries 
 
B: 4-digit industries 
 
Notes: The global frontier is measured by the average of log labor productivity for the top 5% of 
companies with the highest productivity levels within each 3-digit (panel A) or 4-digit (panel B) 
industry. Laggards capture the average log productivity of all the other firms. Unweighted averages 
across 3 (or 4)-digit industries are shown for manufacturing and services, normalized to 0 in the 
starting year. The time period is 2001-2013. The vertical axes represent log-point differences from 
the starting year. Services refer to non-financial business services. 
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Figure A10 
MFPR divergence within more narrowly defined industries 
A: 3-digit industries 
 
B: 4-digit industries 
 
Notes: The global frontier group of firms is defined by the top 5% of companies with the highest 
MFPR levels within each 3-digit (panel A) or 4-digit (panel B) industry. Laggards capture the 
average log productivity of all the other firms. Unweighted averages across 3 (or 4)-digit industries 
are shown for manufacturing and services, normalized to 0 in the starting year. The time period is 
2001-2013. MFPR uses the Wooldridge (2009) methodology based production function estimation 
conducted at the two-digit level to avoid having to work with too few observations per industry. 
The vertical axes represent log-point differences from the starting year. Services refer to non-
financial business services. 
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Figure A11 
Markup corrected MFPR divergence within more narrowly defined industries 
A: 3-digit industries 
 
B: 4-digit industries 
 
Notes: the global frontier is measured by the average of corrected MFPR for the top 5% of 
companies with the highest productivity levels within each 3-digit (panel A) or 4-digit (panel B) 
industry. Laggards capture the average markup corrected MFPR of all the other firms. Unweighted 
averages across 3 (or 4)-digit industries are shown for manufacturing and services, normalized to 
0 in the starting year. MFPR uses the Wooldridge (2009) methodology based production function 
estimation, conducted at the two-digit level to avoid having to work with too few observations per 
industry, while the markup estimation used for corrected MFPR uses the De Loecker and 
Warzynski (2012) methodology. The time period is 2001-2013. The vertical axes represent log-
point differences from the starting year. Services refer to non-financial business services. 
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Appendix B: Illustrative Simulations on Productivity Divergence 
 
Two examples are used to generate time-series patterns of productivity frontier and laggards under 
different assumptions. In both of them, the evolution of the frontier is given by the following 
random-walk with drift process for firm-level MFP : 
 𝛥𝑀𝐹𝑃it = 𝑎 + 𝜀it,     𝜀it ∼ 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜀),  𝑀𝐹𝑃𝑖0 ∼ 𝑁(0, 𝜎MF𝑃0) (B1) 
 
where the following notations apply: 
• a: Trend firm-level productivity growth: 0.5% per annum (i.e. 0.005 log point, mean value 
from the data) 
• 𝜎𝜀: Standard deviation of firm-level annual productivity growth: 0.25 log-points (taken from 
data) 
• 𝜎MF𝑃0: Initial cross-sectional dispersion of MFP: 0.8 (st.dev. of log MFP from the data) 
The frontier is obtained from a distribution as described above, by choosing its top 5% in 
each period. 
 
B.1. Catching-up and market selection: strong convergence 
 
In the case used to illustrate catching-up, the following law of motion is applied for firms outside 
the frontier group: 
 𝛥𝑀𝐹𝑃it = 𝛽(𝑀𝐹𝑃𝐹,𝑡−1 −𝑀𝐹𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1⏟              Gap from the frontier ) + 𝑎 + 𝜀it,     𝜀it ∼ 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜀) (B2) 
 
where 𝑀𝐹𝑃𝐹,𝑡−1 denotes the average of frontier firms in period -t-1, and 𝛽 is the convergence 
parameter, set to 0.15 and is estimated from firm-level data (see Table C1, panel A, col. 1.). Note 
that this law of motion collapses to that of equation (B1) for firms at the frontier where the gap is 
zero. 
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To capture market selection, a decreasing probability of exit is assumed as MFP is higher, 
reaching zero for the frontier and α for the firm with average productivity 𝐸(𝑀𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡). 
 𝑃(exitit) = 𝛼 𝑀𝐹𝑃Ft −𝑀𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡𝑀𝐹𝑃Ft − 𝐸(𝑀𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡), 
 
where 𝛼 is the average probability of exit, set to 0.06, also obtained from the data. Further, the 
number of entrants is such that it compensates for the number of exiting firms (to abstract away 
from changes in the size of the firm population, which is kept at 1,000). Their productivity level 
is centered at the mean of the MFP distribution of the incumbents and is normally distributed with 
the same standard deviation as above for the initial MFP level. 
 
Figure B1 
Simulation results: convergence
 
 
B.2. Weakening catch-up and weakening market selection: stalling convergence 
 
To illustrate a case that produces increasing divergence, the following changes are introduced: 
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• Laggard MFP growth: 𝛽 is declining by 20% after every 2 years 
• Exit: uniform exit probability across the whole productivity distribution 𝑃(exitit) = 2𝛼 
• Entry: the initial level is now centered to only 20% of the mean level of incumbents, and this 
level is halved after every 2 year period. 
 
Figure B2 
Simulation result: stalling convergence 
 
 
These simulations illustrate that the strength of the catch-up process has to weaken over 
time, market selection has to be relatively weak and also worsening in order to produce a diverging 
pattern of the frontier away from the laggard firms.  
Since a large or growing variance of shocks could have the potential to dominate the 
convergence force and could lead to a behavior or “random walk with a drift” (which would 
automatically imply growing dispersion in levels), we have also tested whether high (or growing) 
variance of shocks alone can account for the divergence. The answer is no, because it would require 
implausibly large variance of growth rates (about 0.5, in contrast with the observed 0.25), which 
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in turn would lead to implausibly large growth at the frontier (instead of the observed growth of 
the frontier of about 0.3-0.4 over ten years, it would grow above 2).  
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Appendix C: Assessing the Role of Catching-up 
 
This Appendix presents firm level evidence on the extent to which the pace of productivity 
convergence to the global productivity frontier has changed over time. See Section 3 in the main 
text for more details, including the exact specification.  
The results suggest that on average across time, firms further behind the technological 
frontier have higher MFP growth, reflecting their ability to catch-up based on the adoption of a 
larger stock of unexploited technologies. However, there is also evidence that the pace of 
technological convergence via this mechanism has declined significantly over time. For example, 
while the base effect for the gap term – which provides the effect for 1998-2000 – is positive, the 
interactions with subsequent time periods are often negative. For example, Column 1 of Table A2 
shows that the estimated coefficient on the lagged MFPR gap term declined by almost 30% from 
the late 1990s to the most recent period, with most of this decline realized by 2007. Moreover, this 
slowdown in the pace of productivity convergence is even more pronounced when the model is 
estimated using markup corrected MFPR (column 2). 
These patterns are broadly robust to: i) different measures of MFP (Columns 3); ii) 
including firm age/size interactions with the frontier growth and gap terms to control for the 
potentially evolving composition of firms over time along these dimensions (Table C2); and iii) 
including industry*year fixed effects, which absorb the frontier growth and level terms, hence 
these results capture the declining strength of catching up (increasing persistence) in productivity, 
irrespective of the measurement of the frontier (Table C3). 
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Table C1 
The pace of productivity convergence has slowed over time 
Dependent variable: indicators of MFP growth at the firm level; 1998-2014 
Baseline 
 
Productivity measure MFPR (Wooldridge)
Markup 
corrected MFP
MFPR 
(Solow residual)
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3)
Gapj,t-1
Base effect 0.147*** 0.191*** 0.111***
(0.004) (0.009) (0.009)
0.006 -0.013 0.004
(0.007) (0.013) (0.011)
2002-2005 -0.016*** -0.056*** -0.016
(0.006) (0.010) (0.010)
2005-2007 -0.037*** -0.070*** -0.031***
(0.006) (0.010) (0.010)
2007-2010 -0.023*** -0.076*** -0.029***
(0.007) (0.011) (0.010)
2010-2014 -0.041*** -0.087*** -0.040***
(0.005) (0.009) (0.009)
Δ MFP Frontierj,t-1
Base effect 0.203*** 0.233*** 0.193***
(0.049) (0.059) (0.045)
-0.077 -0.146** -0.077
(0.057) (0.067) (0.055)
2002-2005 -0.050 -0.104 -0.065
(0.058) (0.067) (0.050)
2005-2007 -0.059 -0.105 -0.139***
(0.057) (0.065) (0.051)
2007-2010 0.073 -0.138* 0.025
(0.067) (0.083) (0.055)
2010-2014 -0.095* -0.188*** -0.122**
(0.054) (0.064) (0.049)
R-squared 0.085 0.091 0.068
Country X year FEs Yes Yes Yes
Industry FEs Yes Yes Yes
Firm size and age contr Yes Yes Yes
Obs. / countries 898737 / 21 516062 / 17 898120 / 21
2000-2002 
2000-2002 
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Notes: Results are based on the regressions shown in equation (5) in Section 3. Cluster robust 
standard errors (at the industry-year level) in parentheses. Firm size and age captured by a rich set 
of fixed effects, corresponding to the following categories in employment: below 50, 50-99, 100-
250, 25-999, 1000 and above; and in age: 0-2, 3-4, 5-9, 10-29, 30 and older. The sample is 
restricted to firms that have at least 20 employees on average over time. Notation for p-values: *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table C2 
The pace of productivity convergence has slowed over time 
Dependent variable: indicators of MFP growth at the firm level; 1998-2014 
Age/Size Interactions 
 
Productivity measure MFP (Wooldridge)
Markup 
corrected 
MFP
MFP 
(Solow 
residual)
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3)
Gapj,t-1
Base effect 0.216*** 0.240*** 0.176***
(0.007) (0.013) (0.010)
0.006 -0.012 0.004
(0.007) (0.013) (0.011)
2002-2005 -0.016*** -0.052*** -0.016*
(0.006) (0.010) (0.010)
2005-2007 -0.036*** -0.061*** -0.029***
(0.006) (0.010) (0.010)
2007-2010 -0.021*** -0.070*** -0.027***
(0.007) (0.011) (0.010)
2010-2014 -0.038*** -0.081*** -0.037***
(0.005) (0.009) (0.009)
Δ MFP Frontierj,t-1
Base effect 0.184*** 0.245*** 0.151***
(0.057) (0.080) (0.052)
-0.076 -0.135** -0.076
(0.056) (0.067) (0.055)
2002-2005 -0.048 -0.090 -0.071
(0.058) (0.067) (0.051)
2005-2007 -0.055 -0.087 -0.142***
(0.056) (0.065) (0.051)
2007-2010 0.074 -0.124 0.022
(0.066) (0.081) (0.056)
2010-2014 -0.095* -0.176*** -0.126**
(0.053) (0.064) (0.049)
R-squared 0.087 0.094 0.070
Country X year FEs Yes Yes Yes
Industry FEs Yes Yes Yes
Firm size and age controls Yes Yes Yes
Gapj,t-1 X Sizeclass FEs, 
Frontier growthj,t-1 X Sizeclass 
FEs
Yes Yes Yes
Gapj,t-1 X Ageclass FEs, 
Frontier growthj,t-1 X Ageclass FEs
Yes Yes Yes
Obs. / countries 898737 / 21 516062 / 17 898120 / 21
2000-2002 
2000-2002 
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Notes: Results are based on the regressions shown in equation (5) in Section 3. Cluster robust 
standard errors (at the industry-year level) in parentheses. Firm size and age captured by a rich set 
of fixed effects, corresponding to the following categories in employment: below 50, 50-99, 100-
250, 25-999, 1000 and above; and in age: 0-2, 3-4, 5-9, 10-29, 30 and older. The sample is 
restricted to firms that have at least 20 employees on average over time. Notation for p-values: *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table C3 The pace of productivity convergence has slowed over time 
Dependent variable: indicators of MFP growth at the firm level; 1998-2014 
Including Industry × Year Fixed Effects 
Notes: Results are based on the regressions shown in equation (5) in Section 3. Cluster robust 
standard errors (at the industry-year level) in parentheses. Firm size and age captured by a rich set 
of fixed effects, corresponding to the following categories in employment: below 50, 50-99, 100-
250, 25-999, 1000 and above; and in age: 0-2, 3-4, 5-9, 10-29, 30 and older. The sample is 
restricted to firms that have at least 20 employees on average over time. Notation for p-values: *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Productivity measure MFPR (Wooldridge)
Markup 
corrected 
MFP
MFPR 
(Solow 
residual)
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3)
Gapj,t-1
Base effect 0.158*** 0.196*** 0.115***
(0.005) (0.010) (0.012)
0.008 -0.012 -0.002
(0.008) (0.014) (0.019)
2002-2005 -0.025*** -0.063*** -0.018
(0.007) (0.011) (0.014)
2005-2007 -0.044*** -0.076*** -0.028*
(0.007) (0.012) (0.015)
2007-2010 -0.030*** -0.079*** -0.029**
(0.007) (0.011) (0.014)
2010-2014 -0.053*** -0.093*** -0.050***
(0.006) (0.010) (0.012)
R-squared 0.096 0.099 0.077
Country X year FEs Yes Yes Yes
Industry FEs Yes Yes Yes
Firm size and age 
controls Yes Yes Yes
Obs. / countries 898737 / 21 516062 / 17 898120 / 21
2000-2002 
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Table C4 The frontier group of firms is becoming more entrenched 
Proportion of frontier firms (in %) in year t according to their position in the distribution in t-1 
A: MFPR 
A: Markup corrected MFPR 
Notes: The tables show the proportion of firms classified as global frontier firms at time t – i.e. in 
the top 5% of the MFPR or markup corrected MFPR distribution – according to their status one 
year earlier (t-1). Estimates are averaged over two periods towards the beginning and end of our 
sample. For example, the bottom part of Panel A shows that on average over the period 2011-2013 
in services, 55.2% of frontier firms (i.e. top 5%) were present in the frontier grouping one year 
earlier, while 71.1% had MFPR levels in the top 10% and 77.4% had MFPR levels in the top 20%. 
Sector Time periods
in top 5% in top 10% in top 20%
2001-2003 53.4 67.6 74.0
2011-2013 59.2 72.5 78.7
2001-2003 48.3 62.0 68.8
2011-2013 55.2 71.1 77.4
Manufacturing
Services
Position in the distribution in t-1
Sector Time periods
in top 5% in top 10% in top 20%
2001-2003 46.9 60.4 69.4
2011-2013 52.9 69.6 77.7
2001-2003 42.2 58.2 69.7
2011-2013 48.4 68.3 82.6
Services
Position in the distribution in t-1
Manufacturing
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Appendix D: Aggregate Implications 
In this Appendix we show robustness tests on the results that industries that are characterized by a 
greater productivity gap increase between laggards and frontier are also those that experience 
weaker aggregate productivity growth. The results are robust to changing the long-difference 
period (4 and 6 years, see Table D1), to using an alternative definition for the frontier (time-varying 
5% instead of a fixed number, see Table D2) and in most cases also when we use firm-level labor 
productivity instead of MFP (based on the Wooldridge, 2009, method; see Table D3).  
The sample covers 23 countries over 2001-2013 for 54 detailed industries in the non-
financial market sector (ISIC Rev 4 industry codes 10 to 82). This excludes small industries that 
have less than 50 firms on average across years: mining (5-9), Tobacco (12), Air Transport (51), 
Veterinary activities (75), Services to buildings and landscape activities (81). We also exclude 
employment agencies (78) due to labor input measurement difficulties.  
Table D1 
Productivity divergence and aggregate productivity growth: 
a negative relationship 
Aggregate productivity regressed on the productivity gap (long-differences over 4 or 6 years) 
Notes: All variables are measured in log differences over four or six year periods (with overlaps). 
Standard errors are clustered at the industry level. The productivity gap is defined by using firm-
level MFP (Wooldridge, 2009, methodology). The sample covers 54 industries and 23 countries 
over 2001-2013. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Long-difference window
Dependent variable: 
aggregate productivity measure
Productivity gap measure variant: Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Explanatory variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Δ Productivity gap -0.248*** -0.262*** -0.265*** -0.271*** -0.238*** -0.273*** -0.218** -0.253***
(0.082) (0.065) (0.087) (0.075) (0.086) (0.068) (0.088) (0.070)
R-squared 0.606 0.622 0.478 0.489 0.739 0.751 0.663 0.673
Industry and year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 486 486 486 486 378 378 378 378
Four years Six years
Δ MFP Δ Labour productivityΔ MFP Δ Labour productivity
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Table D2 Productivity divergence and aggregate productivity growth: 
a negative relationship 
Aggregate productivity regressed on the productivity gap, using an alternative definition for the 
frontier  
(long-differences over 5 years) 
Notes: All variables are measured in log differences over five year periods (with overlaps). 
Standard errors are clustered at the industry level. The productivity gap is defined by using firm-
level MFP (Wooldridge, 2009, methodology). The sample covers 54 industries and 23 countries 
over 2001-2013. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Dependent variable: 
aggregate productivity measure
Productivity gap measure variant: Mean Median Mean Median
Explanatory variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Δ Productivity gap -0.191* -0.229*** -0.201* -0.248***
(0.099) (0.082) (0.106) (0.088)
R-squared 0.667 0.680 0.551 0.564
Industry and year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 432 432 432 432
Δ MFP Δ Labour productivity
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Table D3 Productivity divergence and aggregate productivity growth: 
a negative relationship 
Aggregate productivity regressed on the labor productivity gap  
(long-differences over 4, 5 or 6 years) 
Notes: All variables are measured in log differences over four, five or six year periods (with 
overlaps). Standard errors are clustered at the industry level. The productivity gap is defined by 
using firm-level value added based labor productivity. The sample covers 54 industries and 23 
countries over 2001-2013. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Long-difference window
Dependent variable: 
aggregate productivity measure
Productivity gap measure variant: Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Δ Productivity gap -0.122 -0.126* -0.124 -0.163** -0.167** -0.194***
(0.082) (0.074) (0.086) (0.077) (0.076) (0.062)
R-squared 0.455 0.459 0.547 0.558 0.660 0.669
Industry and year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 540 540 432 432 378 378
Δ Labour productivity Δ Labour productivity Δ Labour productivity
Four years Five years Six years
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Table D4 Productivity divergence and aggregate productivity growth: 
a negative relationship 
Aggregate productivity regressed on the MFP gap, controlling for the relative size of the frontier 
(long-differences over 5 years) 
Notes: All variables are measured in log differences over five year periods (with overlaps). 
Standard errors are clustered at the industry level. The productivity gap is defined by using firm-
level MFPR (Wooldridge, 2009). The relative size of the frontier is measured as the log of the ratio 
of mean employment between the frontier and laggard groups, within each detailed industry and 
year. The sample covers 54 industries and 23 countries over 2001-2013. Significance levels: *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Dependent variable: 
aggregate productivity measure
Productivity gap measure variant: Mean Median Mean Median
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Δ Productivity gap -0.225** -0.280*** -0.209** -0.258***
(0.093) (0.069) (0.100) (0.084)
Δ Relative size 0.027 0.033 0.015 0.021
(0.022) (0.022) (0.029) (0.028)
R-squared 0.686 0.708 0.559 0.575
Industry and year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 432 432 432 432
Δ MFP Δ Labour productivity
72 
Appendix E: The Evolution of Product Market Regulation 
The indicators reveal that there is considerable scope for further product market reform in many 
OECD countries, particularly in market services where the increase in MFP divergence has been 
most striking (Gal and Hijzen, 2016 and Figure E1). Within non-manufacturing industries, most 
reform activity over the past 15 years has been concentrated in network industries (i.e. energy, 
transport and communication), and this is reflected in both a decline in the median level and 
dispersion of market regulation across countries. While there remains some scope for further 
reform action in specific network industries (particularly road and rail transportation) and 
countries, the need for reforms in retail trade and in particular professional services is clear. 
Between 1998 and 2013, the median restrictiveness of product market regulations was little 
changed in professional services (Panel B of Figure E1), while the dispersion in the restrictiveness 
of market regulations across countries in these sectors remains high. 
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Table E1 
Descriptive statistics: PMR and national MFP gaps 
Unit of observation: country-industry-year 
Notes: All variables are measured in logs. Regulated services include those industries that are 
covered by the PMR indicator (see details in Appendix D).   
Sources: Orbis (for productivity gaps); OECD Product Market Regulation Database (for the PMR 
indicator). 
PMR Gap in MFP
Gap in 
markup 
corr. MFP
Mean 0.607 1.294 1.272
Median 0.811 1.163 1.127
St.dev. 0.673 0.470 0.523
N 564 564 471
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Figure E1 
The restrictiveness of product market regulations over time, 1998-2013 
A: Network industries 
B: Professional services 
Notes: The PMR indicator varies between 0 and 6, and higher values indicate more stringent and 
less competition-friendly regulation. The horizontal line in the boxes represents the median, the 
upper and lower edges of each boxes reflect the 25th and 75th percentiles and the markers on the 
extremes denote the maximum and the minimum across OECD countries. 
Source: calculations by Gal and Hijzen (2016) based on OECD indicators on product market 
regulation (PMR) and additional information on the timing of reforms for retail and professional.  
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E.1. Robustness on MFP divergence and PMR 
This section presents a series of robustness checks on the impact of product market regulation on 
the productivity gap between the global frontier and other firms. 
Table E2 
Robustness to changing the long difference window 
Estimation method – four-year long differences 
B: Estimation method – six-year long differences 
Notes: Cluster robust standard errors (at the country-industry level) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Both the MFP gap and the PMR indicator are measured in log terms. The MFP 
gap is calculated at the country-industry-year level, by taking the difference between the average 
Dependent variable
Explanatory variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
0.166*** 0.190*** 0.277** 0.292**
(0.057) (0.064) (0.112) (0.142)
Country fixed effects YES NO YES NO
Industry fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Year fixed effects YES NO YES NO
Country X year fixed effects NO YES NO YES
Observations 512 512 421 421
R-squared 0.158 0.287 0.228 0.397
Δ MFP gap Δ Mark-up corrected MFP gap
Δ Product Market Regulations,c,t
Dependent variable
Explanatory variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
0.267*** 0.277*** 0.452*** 0.452***
(0.070) (0.096) (0.128) (0.149)
Country fixed effects YES NO YES NO
Industry fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Year fixed effects YES NO YES NO
Country X year fixed effects NO YES NO YES
Observations 400 400 329 329
R-squared 0.297 0.413 0.413 0.550
Δ MFP gap Δ Mark-up corrected MFP gap
Δ Product Market Regulations,c,t
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log productivity at the frontier and among other firms. The time period is 1998-2013. See more 
details in the Section 5.4. 
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Table E3 
Robustness to median MFP of laggard firms 
Estimation method – five-year long differences 
Notes: Cluster robust standard errors (at the country-industry level) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Both the MFP gap and the PMR indicator are measured in log terms. The MFP 
gap is calculated at the country-industry-year level, by taking the difference between the global 
frontier and the median of log productivity of non-frontier firms. The time period is 1998-2013. 
Dependent variable
Explanatory variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
0.190** 0.234** 0.275*** 0.262**
(0.076) (0.089) (0.093) (0.114)
Country fixed effects YES NO YES NO
Industry fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Year fixed effects YES NO YES NO
Country X year fixed effects NO YES NO YES
Observations 458 458 376 376
R-squared 0.199 0.316 0.330 0.459
Δ MFP gap Δ Mark-up corrected MFP gap
Δ Product Market Regulations,c,t
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Appendix F: Data and Productivity Measurement 
Table F1 
Information providers underlying the Orbis Database 
Source: Bureau van Dijk, reflecting their set of information providers as of March 2016. 
F.1. Data 
This paper uses a harmonized firm-level productivity database, based on underlying data from the 
recently updated OECD-Orbis database (see Gal, 2013). The database contains several 
productivity measures (variants of labor productivity and multi-factor productivity, MFP) and 
Information provider   Country
Bisnode  Czech Republic, Slovakia
Bureau van Dijk   Luxembourg
Cerved   Italy
Cortera   US
Coface Slovenia   Slovenia
Creditreform Austria   Austria
Creditreform Latvia   Latvia
Creditreform Luxembourg   Luxembourg
Creditreform-Interinfo   Hungary
Ellisphere   France
Experian   NorwayDenmark
ICAP   Greece
InfoCredit   Poland
Informa   Spain
Informa Portugal   Portugal
Jordans   United Kingdom, Ireland
Kamer van Koophandel   Netherlands
Krediidiinfo   Estonia
LexisNexis   Netherlands
National Bank of Belgium   Belgium
NICE Info   Korea
Suomen Asiakastieto   Finland
Thomson Reuters   US - Listed companies
TSR   Japan
UC   Sweden
Verband der Vereine Creditreform  Germany
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covers up to 24 OECD countries over the period 1997 to 2014 for the non-farm, non-financial 
business sector.41 These countries are: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, 
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Slovenia, the Slovak Republic and the 
United States. The country coverage is somewhat smaller in the policy analysis, given the limited 
availability of the policy indicators, or lack thereof, for some of the 24 countries considered. The 
industry coverage means retaining industries with 2 digit codes from 5 to 82, excluding 64-66 in 
the European classification system NACE Rev 2, which is equivalent to the international 
classification system ISIC Rev. 4 at the two-digit level. 
As discussed in Gal (2013), these data come from annual balance sheets and income 
statements, collected by an electronic publishing firm called Bureau van Dijk, using a variety of 
underlying sources ranging from credit rating agencies (e.g. Cerved in Italy) to national banks (e.g. 
National Bank of Belgium for Belgium) as well as financial information providers (e.g. Thomson 
Reuters for the US). See the full list of information providers to Bureau van Dijk regarding 
financial information for the set of countries retained in the analysis in Table F1. 
Orbis is the largest cross-country company-level database that is available and accessible 
for economic and financial research. However, since the information is primarily collected for use 
in the private sector typically with the aim of financial benchmarking, a number of steps need to 
be undertaken before the data can be used for economic analysis. The steps we apply closely follow 
suggestions by Kalemli-Ozcan, Sorensen, Villegas-Sanchez, Volosovych and Yesiltas (2015) and 
previous OECD experience (Gal, 2013). Three broad steps are (i) ensuring comparability of 
monetary variables across countries and over time (PPP conversion and deflation); (ii) deriving 
new variables that will be used in the analysis (capital stock, productivity); and (iii) keeping 
company accounts with valid and relevant information for our present purposes (filtering or 
cleaning). Finally, Orbis is a subsample of the universe of companies for most countries, retaining 
the larger and hence probably more productive firms. To mitigate problems arising from this, we 
exclude firms with less than 20 employees on average over their observed lifespan. 
41
 This means retaining industries with 2 digit codes from 5 to 82, excluding 64-66 in the European classification 
system NACE Rev 2, which is equivalent to the international classification system ISIC Rev. 4 at the two-digit level. 
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A number of issues that commonly affect productivity measurement should be kept in mind 
when using this data. First, differences in the quality and utilisation of capital and labor inputs 
cannot be accounted for as the capital stock is measured in book values and labor input by the 
number of employees.42 Secondly, to measure output in internationally comparable price, we use 
the country-industry level purchasing power parity database of Inklaar and Timmer (2014). 
However, there remain important challenge, details therein for the tradeoffs involved in deriving 
their PPP measures. Finally, similar to most firm-level datasets, Orbis contains variables on 
outputs and inputs in nominal values and no additional separate information on firm-specific prices 
and quantities (i.e. we observe total sales of steel bars, but no information on tonnes of steel bars 
sold and price per ton), thus output is proxied by total revenues or total value added. Even though 
we deflate these output measures by country-industry-year level deflators (at the two-digit detail), 
differences in measured (revenue) productivity across firms within a given industry may still 
reflect both differences in technology as well as differences in market power.43 As described 
further below, we attempt to correct our productivity measures for differences in market power by 
deriving firm- and time- specific markups following De Loecker and Warzynski (2012). 
F.2. Variable definitions 
Value added 
It is defined as the sum of gross profits and the costs of employees. More specifically, value added 
is the sum of the following accounting categories as available from earnings statements: Profit (net 
income) for the period + Depreciation + Taxation + Interests paid + Cost of employees. 
Capital stock 
42
 The measurement of intangible fixed assets in the balance sheets follows accounting rules, hence the total fixed 
assets (sum of tangibles and intangibles) may understate the overall capital stock (Corrado et al, 2009). Moreover, 
different depreciation rates and investment price deflators cannot be applied, since an asset type breakdown is not 
available. 
43
 In the above example, it is unclear whether revenue based productivity is higher because the firm is producing more 
steel bars, or whether the firm’s higher observed productivity is driven by higher prices reflecting high markups, which 
the firm can charge because of a lack of competition, for example. 
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It is derived from the book value of fixed assets using the perpetual inventory method on gross 
investments - deflated by two-digit country-specific investment deflators – and the initially 
observed fixed assets. Firm-specific depreciation rates are derived using the book value of 
depreciation and fixed assets. To obtain a measure of real capital stock 𝐾it, the perpetual inventory 
method (PIM) is applied by using the book value of fixed assets 𝐾itBV (for each firm i and year t),
derived gross investment series from them and two-digit industry deflators. More precisely, the 
dynamic evolution of the real capital stock 𝐾it is given by the degree of depreciation 𝛿it, 
investments 𝐼it and the value of the capital stock in the previous period 𝐾𝑖,𝑡−1 in the following
manner: 
𝐾it = 𝐾𝑖,𝑡−1(1 − 𝛿it) + 𝐼it.
The depreciation rate is defined as the observed book value of depreciation divided by the 
sum of the previous value of capital stock and depreciation: 𝛿it = DepritBVDepritBV+𝐾𝑖,𝑡−1BV . Using firm-specific
book value depreciation rates has its limitation but we view it better than the alternative of using 
industry-specific depreciation rates based on more accurate measures for changes in asset values 
over time but which are by nature homogeneous across firms. In contrast firm-specific depreciation 
rates – even if book values -– will reflect differences in the asset composition (i.e. firms that use 
more structures and buildings but fewer machinery and equipment will have lower depreciation 
rates). Since the balance sheet data is harmonized across countries by the data provider of Orbis, 
the role of country specific differences in accounting rules for depreciation rates should be 
minimized. In any case in the regressions containing country*time fixed effects, this issue is 
further mitigated. 
We defined the real value of gross investment 𝐼it as the annual change in book value of 
fixed tangible assets 𝐾itBV plus depreciation DepritBV, deflated by the gross fixed capital formation
deflator 𝑃𝐼𝑐jt (specific to each country c and two-digit industry j, sourced from detailed OECD 
National Accounts): 𝐼it = (𝐾itBV − 𝐾𝑖,𝑡−1BV + DepritBV)/𝑃𝐼cjt.
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Finally, the starting value of the real capital stock 𝐾𝑖0 for each f irm is the book value of
fixed assets deflated by the investment deflator: 
𝐾𝑖0 = 𝐾𝑖0BV/𝑃𝐼𝑐𝑗0.
Missing values in the raw data for fixed assets are filled up by linear interpolation, invoking the 
implicit assumption that depreciation offsets gross investments (“steady state”). The same 
principle is applied for missing values for depreciation. 
MFP 
Our preferred measure of MFP is based on a production function estimation, using the Wooldridge 
(2009) control function based methodology, with the number of employees and real capital as 
inputs and materials as the proxy variable. More specifically, we assume a value added based 
Cobb-Douglas production function and estimate regressions of the following form, separately for 
each detailed (NACE Rev 2, 2-digit level) industry j:  
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝐾𝑗𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝐿𝑗𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝜈𝑐𝑗 + 𝜂𝑡𝑗 + 𝜀it, for all industries 𝑗 = 1,… 𝐽 (F1) 
where 𝑦it denotes log of real value added, 𝑘it denotes the log of real capital stock, and 𝑙it the log 
of the number of employees. 𝜈𝑐𝑗  and 𝜂𝑡𝑗  are country and year fixed effects, respectively (allowed to
vary for each 2-digit industry), and 𝜀it is the error term. Real values for value added are obtained 
by dividing nominal values by country specific two-digit industry deflators.  
We employ the one-step GMM estimation method proposed by Wooldridge (2009), which 
mitigates the endogeneity problem of input choices by using material inputs as proxy variables for 
productivity and lagged values of labor as instruments. This approach addresses the critique of 
Ackerberg et al (2015) on the identification of the labor coefficient, and also makes estimations 
more efficient and robust since it avoids using a two-step approach. 
More specifically, in order to avoid the endogeneity of inputs and a correlation between 
the error term and the choice of labor input (violating 𝐸(𝜀it|𝑙it) = 0), the estimation is done
through one-step GMM with the following form: 
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𝑦it = 𝛽𝐾𝑗𝑘it + 𝛽𝐿𝑗𝑙it + 𝑔(𝑘𝑖𝑡−1, 𝑚𝑖𝑡−1) + 𝜈𝑐,𝑗 + 𝜂𝑡,𝑗 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡. (F2) 
The function 𝑔(. ) is a 3rd degree polynomial including all base terms, 2nd and 3rd order 
interactions of 𝑘𝑖𝑡−1 and 𝑚𝑖𝑡−1. The lagged value of labor 𝑙𝑖𝑡−1 is used as an instrument along with 
all terms containing 𝑘it, 𝑘𝑖𝑡−1 and 𝑚𝑖𝑡−1, which act as their own instruments as they are assumed 
to be predetermined. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. 
Finally, MFPR, i.e. revenue based multi-factor productivity44 is defined in logs using the estimated 
coefficients (output elasticities) for capital and labor in equation (F2):45 
𝑀𝐹𝑃𝑅it ≐ 𝑦it − ?^?𝐾𝑗 𝑘it − ?^?𝐿𝑗 𝑙it. (F3) 
The production function is estimated separately for each two-digit industry but pooled 
across all countries, controlling for country and year fixed effects. This allows for inherent 
technological differences across industries, while at the same time ensures comparability of MFP 
levels across countries and over time by having a uniform labor and capital coefficient along these 
dimensions. 
Before running the production function estimations, a number of additional cleaning rules 
were applied. In particular, within each two-digit industry, those observations are excluded where 
log(value added/employment), log(capital/employment) and log (materials/employment) are 
outside the top or bottom 0.5% of their distribution to avoid the impact of extreme observations 
on the production function estimation.  
The estimated coefficients are statistically significant and economically meaningful in that 
the labor coefficients tend to be higher in services than in manufacturing and overall they range 
44
 The use of industry level deflators, rather than firm level prices leads to a wedge between firm and industry level 
prices and thus our productivity measure will also be affected by the profitability of firms, driven by their market 
power. In order to correct for the potential impact of market power on our productivity estimates we also estimate 
firm- and time specific markups and correct our MFP measure for them. 
45
 To avoid limiting the sample size unnecessarily, the MFP measures are also calculated for those firms where 
intermediate inputs are not observed. With the actual implementation of Wooldridge (2009), we follow the Stata 
program codes provided by Petrin and Levinsohn (2012). 
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between 0.6 and 0.85. The production function estimation results are available upon request. In 
order to maximize coverage for our MFP measures, they are also calculated as a residual from the 
estimated production function for those firms where materials (our measure of intermediate inputs) 
are not available. However, the first step of the markup estimation also relies on materials, hence 
the sample size reduction in the markup corrected MFP measures. 
Markups 
In order to mitigate the limitations of firm-level productivity measurement due to not observing 
firm-level prices, we correct our revenue based MFP measure by firm- and time-varying markups 
applying the markup estimation methodology of De Loecker and Warzynski (2012). We introduce 
a notation for markup corrected MFP estimates as MFPR𝑐, and we define it for each firm i and
year t as follows: 
𝑀𝐹𝑃𝑅𝑖𝑡𝑐 = 𝑀𝐹𝑃𝑅𝑖𝑡 − log(𝜇𝑖𝑡 ), (F4) 
influenced by market power changes under the assumption that at least one input of production is 
fully flexible (e.g. labor or materials). 
The markup is derived from the supply-side approach originally proposed by Hall (1986) 
and more recently re-explored and adapted to firm-level applications by De Loecker and 
Warzynski (2012). As described therein, the approach computes markups without any assumptions 
about the demand function, but only relying on available information on output and inputs. Their 
two crucial assumptions are that at least one input is fully flexible and that firms minimize costs. 
Thus, the markup – defined as the ratio of the output price P over marginal cost MC – is derived 
from the first order condition of the plant’s cost minimization problem with respect to the flexible 
input k as: 𝜇𝑖𝑡(𝑘) = 𝑃𝑖𝑡𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑡 = Output Elasticity𝑖𝑘𝑡Output Share𝑖𝑘𝑡 (F5) 𝜇𝑖𝑡(𝑘) = ?^?𝑘𝑗𝑤𝑠˜ 𝑖𝑡. (F6) 
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For example, in case the flexible input is taken to be labor (𝑚 = 𝐿), its coefficient ?^?𝐿𝑗  in 
the numerator of equation (F6) is estimated using the GMM estimation method by Wooldridge 
(2009), as described above. The denominator is obtained by using a prediction of firm-level value 
added by a rich polynomial function of observable inputs in order to retain only the anticipated 
part of output developments.46 The rationale for using this correction is the assumption that firms 
do not observe unanticipated shocks to production when making optimal input decisions. 
Given that labor input may not be fully flexible – especially in countries with rigid labor 
markets – we also calculated markups using materials as the fully flexible input for a subset of 18 
countries for which data are available. In that case, a gross-output based production function is 
estimated to obtain a coefficient for materials, again following Wooldridge (2009). As shown in 
Appendix A, the divergence in MFP is robust to these different choices. 
As noted in De Loecker and Warzynski (2012), the low demand in terms of additional 
assumptions of their approach and the lack of information on firm level prices bear some costs. 
Given that we do not observe firms’ physical output, the approach is only informative on the way 
markups change over time (not their level) and in relative terms, i.e. on the correlation with firm 
characteristics (e.g. productivity, size, export status) rather than in absolute levels. In what follows 
therefore, we will focus at relative trends in markups for frontier and laggard firms. 
We provide below a more detailed description of the time varying firm-specific markup 
calculation as proposed by De Loecker and Warzynski (2012). Under cost minimization and 
flexibility of at least one of the inputs X it can be shown that the output elasticity equals (left hand 
side below) its cost share (right hand side): 𝜕𝑌𝑖𝑡𝜕𝑋𝑖𝑡 / 𝑌𝑖𝑡𝑋𝑖𝑡 = 𝑃𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑡𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑌𝑖𝑡 (F7) 
where 𝑌,  𝐶 and 𝑃𝑋 are output, marginal cost and input price, respectively.
Then by introducing a definition for the markup as 
46
 The polynomial includes all possible interactions between labor, capital and materials containing first and second 
degree terms, along with first and second degree base effects. This adopts the Stata program code provided by De 
Loecker and Warzynski (2012) with their online Appendix, with the difference that for computational reasons we 
omitted the third degree terms. 
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𝜇𝑖𝑡 = 𝑃𝑖𝑡𝑀𝐶𝑖𝑡, 
we can rewrite equation (F7) as follows: 
𝜇𝑖𝑡 = 𝜕𝑌𝑖𝑡𝜕𝑋𝑖𝑡𝑌𝑖𝑡𝑋𝑖𝑡 / 𝑃𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑡𝑃𝑖𝑡𝑌𝑖𝑡 =  𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡 𝐸𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑋 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑋⁄ .
This is the relationship that the actual implementation will exploit. The exact steps of that are 
as follows: 
1. Identifying the output elasticities of inputs from estimating the production function using
Wooldridge (2009), obtaining ?^?𝐿𝑗 , since labor is assumed to be the flexible input in our 
baseline case. As a robustness check we also calculate – and show our main result of 
productivity divergence in Figure A8 in Appendix A – a gross output based production 
function where materials enter as a separate input and they are considered as the flexible input 
for the markup calculation. 
2. Calculating the share of input costs in revenue, using as the baseline employment as flexible
input. This boils down to a variant of the wage share 𝑤𝑠it˜ = WLitVAit̃ . This is
– partly directly observed from the data, for labor costs: 𝑊𝐿it in the numerator
– partly estimated, for the corrected value added VAit̃  in the denominator. The aim of
the correction is to retrieve that part of output (measured here by value added) that is
anticipated by the firm. This is needed because we assume that firms minimize costs
based on a “prediction” of value added i.e. they do not take into account unexpected
shocks to production. The prediction is based on fitting a rich polynomial function of
inputs on value added, capturing the anticipated part of output:
𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑡 = ℎ(𝑘it, 𝑙it, 𝑚it) + 𝜈𝑐,𝑗 + 𝜂𝑡,𝑗 + 𝜖it,
– where the function ℎ(. ) contains all base effects and interactions containing first and
second order terms in an additive way, following the code in the online Appendix by
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De Loecker and Warzynski (2012). They compute the predicted level of value added 
as follows, which we also adopt: 
 𝑉𝐴𝑖?̃? = 𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡exp(𝜖𝑖?̂?),  
 
where 𝜖it^ is the residual obtained from the previous equation and 𝑉𝐴it is value added 
as observed in the data. 
3. Deriving the markup 𝜇it as the ratio of the output elasticity of employment and the corrected 
wage share: 
𝜇𝑖𝑡(𝐿) = ?^?𝐿𝑗𝑤𝑠it˜ . 
 
Deflation and currency conversion 
 
Real values are obtained by applying two-digit industry value added deflators from detailed OECD 
National Accounts. This uses the ISIC Rev. 4 variant of the classification of activities. If deflators 
are missing at the two-digit industry detail, they are filled up by applying the growth rate in the 
price index at the immediate higher level of aggregation. For instance, if textile manufacturing 
(industry code 13) has missing information on the value added deflator for a particular country in 
a particular year, the growth rate from the immediate higher level (Textiles and wearing apparel, 
industry group 13-14) is used. If that is missing as well, then once more the immediate higher level 
(Textiles, wearing apparel, leather and related products industry group 13-15) is used. The same 
practice is followed for the other deflators used in the paper: gross output, value added, 
intermediate inputs and gross fixed capital formation. We use the country-industry level 
purchasing power parity database of Inklaar and Timmer (2014), see details therein for the trade-
offs involved in deriving their PPP measures. 
 
Filtering and cleaning 
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In order to limit the influence of erratic or implausible firm-behaviour, we exclude information for 
firms that report an extreme annual log-change (growth). More precisely, the variable is set to 
missing for the whole observed life of the firm if at least once, the variable has a growth rate that 
is in the top or bottom 1% of the growth distribution, at least once during their observed period. 
We do this procedure for the following variables: labor productivity measures, MFP measures, 
employment, capital, capital ratio, intermediates, value added and gross output. The rationale 
behind being relatively strict is that when a big growth rate – i.e. level shift – is observed, it is 
difficult to know whether the pre- or the post- shift period should be retained for the analysis. By 
removing the whole firm, we are also likely to exclude cases when a firm purchased another 
(relatively large) one as well as when a firm is being split-up. Put differently, this method ensures 
that firms undergoing major changes arising from mergers, acquisitions or spinoffs – which are 
outside the scope of this analysis – are excluded, even if their legal identifier in the underlying 
database remains unchanged. 
 
Representativeness issues 
 
A key drawback of Orbis is that it is a selected sample of larger and more productive firms and 
thus tends to under-represent smaller and younger firms in some economies. Accordingly, we 
exclude firms with less than 20 employees. Even so, the analysis of the MFP growth of laggard 
firms should be interpreted with particular caution, to the extent that laggards are likely to be less 
well represented in the sample. 
While this issue is probably less of a concern for firms at the national and global frontier, 
some other issues remain. For example, the reporting unit (establishment or firm) may be different 
across countries. A related issue is that countries may apply different accounting requirements. For 
instance, US companies in Orbis report their financial statement in a consolidated manner, while 
in most European countries the database contains mainly unconsolidated accounts.47 Accordingly, 
                                                 
47
 Working with a mix of the two types of accounts carries the risk of double counting certain activities if a firm files 
both consolidated and unconsolidated accounts. However, the aim of this paper is not to measure aggregate economic 
activity but to analyse the determinants of firms’ behavior. Thus, the ideal reporting and consolidation level (i.e. group, 
firm or establishment) should be the one that most closely reflects managerial decisions. It is a difficult task to judge 
a priori which level that is, but most of the literature assumes it is either the firm or the group. For these reasons, we 
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the coverage of Orbis is less satisfactory for the United States than many European countries, 
although its coverage of US affiliates abroad is still good. Furthermore, multinational firms may 
systematically shift profits across the countries in which they have affiliates, depending on the tax 
system of the countries of its affiliates (see OECD 2013). A priori, it is not clear in which direction 
these factors will bias the analysis given that the focus is only on the global frontier and the gap 
relative to “all laggard firms” and thus country boundaries are less relevant. However, it is 
reassuring that the key result of Section 4 – i.e. that global frontier firms have become relatively 
more productive over the 2000s compared to other firms – is robust to excluding firms that are 
part of a multi-national group (i.e. headquarters or subsidiaries) where profit-shifting activity may 
be relevant. However, this comes at the cost of significantly reducing the number of observations, 
so it is not incorporated in the baseline specification but is instead presented as a robustness test 
(Appendix A, Figure A6). 
Another caveat is that emerging market economies are not well represented in the database 
hence they are not included in our analysis. While this is unlikely to significantly affect the 
measurement of the global productivity frontier, it may have implications for diffusion if global 
frontier technologies are increasingly diffusing to firms in emerging markets but not to those in 
OECD economies. However, this seems unlikely, in light of the evidence presented in Comin and 
Mestieri (2018) which highlights impediments related to the penetration of new technologies 
across a sample of developed and developing economies alike. 
The composition of countries in the frontier is probably still not entirely accurate, as the 
Orbis database has a low coverage of US company accounts that are suitable for productivity 
analysis (Gal, 2013). Nevertheless, as discussed in Andrews, Criscuolo and Gal (2015), firms 
located in the United States, and other highly developed countries, are well-represented in the 
global frontier grouping. Moreover, this definition of the global frontier seems to match anecdotal 
evidence with for example Finland and Korea having firms at the global frontier in most ICT 
sectors, or Italy being well represented at the global frontier in the textiles industry. 
 
  
                                                 
give priority to consolidated accounts by removing the unconsolidated ones for companies where both types of 
accounts are present in the data. 
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